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ABSTRACT 
The United States Department of Defense finds itself 
in a period of reduced resources and growing requirements.  
In the field of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), there have been calls for both 
manpower and system cuts, while collection requirements 
continue to increase.  One proposed method for maximizing 
ISR collection efforts is the development of multi-mission 
capable collection equipment.  In support of this concept, 
BAE Systems has developed the Joint Multi-Mission Electro-
optical System (JMMES).  Designed for potential use on both 
manned and unmanned aircraft, JMMES is capable of multi-
mission integration and target prosecution without the need 
to exchange system components or system operator, thus 
increasing flexibility, responsiveness, and capabilities, 
while reducing manning and cost requirements.  JMMES 
incorporates multi-spectral technology and advanced search 
algorithms to enhance autonomous collection capabilities. 
Our thesis investigates how a JMMES equipped SH-60 
variant aircraft affects U.S. ISR capabilities in the 
littoral regions, specifically in the areas of Anti 
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Surface Warfare (SUW), Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO), and Search and Rescue (SAR).  
We teamed with the faculty research group in conducting 
JCTD test flights during Trident Warrior 2009.  Utilizing 
both quantitative and qualitative results and analysis from 
the exercise flights and post-flight surveys, we developed 
an organizational simulation model, using VDT, to evaluate 
the benefits of JMMES. 
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The United States military has entered a period of 
constrained budgets and increasing operational commitments 
against a diverse set of adversaries.  These adversaries 
employ unique and evolving tactics, such as suicide bomber 
attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and loosely 
connected networks, all designed to avoid United States 
(U.S.) dominance in mass on mass engagements.  To achieve 
success in this challenging period, U.S. forces must 
counter the adversary’s attempts to avoid detection and 
engagement by advanced weapons systems. As such, it has 
become increasingly difficult, yet vitally important, to 
maintain a situational awareness (SA) advantage. In order 
to achieve this end, new sensor technologies and 
operational employment techniques must continue to be 
sought.   
B. OVERVIEW 
Many of the conflicts in the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) provide evidence of adversaries increasing their 
abilities to avoid detection and targeting by U.S. forces.  
During the period from 2004 to 2007, the ubiquitous use of 
IEDs in Iraq produced numerous U.S. coalition casualties.  
This technique has become quite successful for anti-
coalition fighters (ACF) due to the difficulty in 
discriminating IEDs and those emplacing them from the non-
dangerous elements of the environment.  In Afghanistan, 
both Taliban and Al Qaeda forces conducted attacks in 
challenging mountainous areas that afforded cover and 
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concealment for their small bands of fighters.  Off the 
coast of Somalia, pirates have utilized small fast-boats to 
hijack ships on the open seas.  These are just a few 
examples of the challenges confronting U.S. forces around 
the globe.  In all cases, the adversary has attempted to 
avoid decisive mass-on-mass engagements and has instead 
sought to remain unnoticed prior to attacking. 
When U.S. forces are able to detect an adversary prior 
to an attack, the results are overwhelmingly in favor of 
the United States.  U.S. forces in Iraq have found success 
using electro optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors to 
detect ACF emplacing IEDs, resulting in a lethal strike 
from a precision guided munitions (PGM).  In Afghanistan, 
terrorist leaders have been tracked and killed by strikes 
from Predator unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) equipped with 
EO/IR sensors and PGMs.  For maritime interdiction 
operations (MIO), aircraft equipped with EO/IR sensors 
provide vital information that affords validation of 
targets and awareness of the operating environment.  By 
taking away the enemy's ability to hide, U.S. forces are 
able to greatly reduce the advantage sought by adversaries.  
In order to achieve the desired detection of enemy 
combatants, the intelligence community utilizes an 
assortment of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors.  These sensors vary according 
to operating environments and specific detection 
requirements, and are typically designed to operate in EO, 
IR, or radio bands of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. 
Each individual band of the EM spectrum has unique 
advantages and disadvantages depending on a variety of 
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factors, including atmospheric attenuation, target 
distance, and target cross-section.  As EM energy 
propagates from the object to the detecting sensor, the 
atmosphere attenuates the signal.  The amount of 
attenuation that occurs varies with frequency.  Figure 1 
depicts how atmospheric attenuation affects EM frequencies.  
The horizontal axis shows the frequency range of the EM 
energy, as well as the associated wavelength, while the 
vertical axis shows the atmospheric attenuation that occurs 
at the given frequency.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Atmospheric Attenuation Across EM Spectrum1 
                     
1 Christian Ho, NASA “Radio Wave Propagation Handbook for 
Communication on and Around Mars,” 
http://descanso.jpl.nasa.gov/Propagation/mars/MarsPub_sec4.pdf, 
accessed 15 September 2009. 
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EO and IR sensors are passive devices that rely on the 
detection of the radiations emitted by the target.2 EO 
systems perform very well in daylight conditions and 
provide detail that allows for positive identification of 
targets.  However, EO systems perform poorly in darkness 
and are susceptible to obscurants in the air such as smoke, 
smog, clouds and dust. IR systems are capable of imaging 
objects without need for solar illumination and through 
some obscurants that adversely affect EO systems.  However, 
IR systems are not capable of providing as high a degree of 
image detail as EO systems. EO and IR systems both have 
maximum operational ranges of a few kilometers.   
Conversely, Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) 
systems are active sensors that emit energy that is 
reflected from targets.  RADAR systems perform equally well 
during day or night conditions and suffer less atmospheric 
attenuation than EO or IR systems. As such, they are 
capable of much greater ranges.  Utilizing RADER systems to 
direct EO/IR sensors directly to targets allows for hi-
resolution imagery in less time than if EO/IR sensor was 
conducting an independent search for target. By carefully 
selecting the mix of sensors, the probability of detection 
of adversaries increases. 
The information collected by these sensors must 
undergo some degree of analysis and culling, to provide 
end-users with pertinent information.  Analysis can be done 
by either computer systems, humans, or a combination of 
                     
2 A. Nejat Ince, Ercan Topuz, Erdal Panyirgi,Cevdet Isik: Principles 
of Integrated Maritime Surveillance Systems (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers: Boston, 2000), 125. 
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both. The time required for analysis varies by ISR system 
due to the varied amount and type of information collected.   
EO/IR systems produce images that must be scanned for 
recognizable patterns of targets.  Computers have an 
ability to continually scan imagery for long periods of 
time without risk of degraded performance due to boredom or 
fatigue.  Humans posses a greater capability to pattern 
match visual images, but they are susceptible to 
performance errors.  Combining computer and human analysis 
allows for the benefits of each system to be utilized 
resulting in enhanced capabilities. The analysis of EO/IR 
images can be done at the location of the sensor or at a 
central location 
After the information has been collected and analyzed, 
it must be disseminated to end-users. The end-users are 
typically military commanders or small-unit leaders who 
utilize information from the ISR process to develop and 
maintain SA. The dissemination process requires that 
information be transmitted between sensors, operator, 
analysts, and finally to the end user. Each re-transmission 
of the information presents the possibility for delay, or 
degradation, as well as increased manpower requirements.  
Looking at the dissemination process from a systems-
analysis perspective, there is room for modification and 
improved performance. 
In examining the process of obtaining and 
disseminating ISR information, it is evident that the ISR 
process is a complex system-of-systems.  Each element is 
susceptible to adverse effects ranging from an adversary’s 
detection avoidance techniques to dissemination delays. If 
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the interrelationships of the systems are not considered, a 
seemingly simple change can result in degraded performance 
of the entire ISR process. Improved understanding of the 
various systems in the ISR process allows for modifications 
that can yield significant performance improvements. We 
will examine the ISR process in more detail in Chapter II. 
C. CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING ISR CAPABILITIES  
In order to maintain ISR capabilities as adversaries, 
and operating environments change, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) continually seeks improvements to existing 
equipment, as well as new innovations. The U.S. Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and Concepts 
(DUSD/AS&C) helps the DoD seek technological advantages 
against adversaries by identifying the best operational 
concepts and technology solutions for transformational, 
joint, and coalition warfare.3  One means DUSD/AS&C uses to 
accomplish this critical function is the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) process.4  The JCTD process 
creates a structured method for private industry to 
demonstrate new operational concepts, utilizing mature or 
maturing technologies, to solve important military 
problems.  The partnership between private industry and 
DUSD/AS&C allows for more rapid fielding of new concepts 
and has proven successful in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and GWOT.  Before being accepted for use in  
 
 
                     
3 Office for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, “AS&C/JCTD Mission Statement,” 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/jctd/aboutus.html, accessed 15 September 2009.  
4 Ibid. 
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the DoD, new concepts and equipment must demonstrate an 
acceptable level of performance in scenarios designed to 
simulate anticipated missions. 
The different services in DoD have unique requirements 
for ISR system capabilities.  Threats to U.S. Navy (USN) 
ships are increasingly coming from smaller boats operating 
in highly dispersed or independent manners, as well as 
mines and other threats with small cross sections. There is 
also a growing need to engage pirates and smugglers in MIO.  
Because the ISR process is a system-of-systems, it is 
not wise to focus solely on equipment improvements.  
Innovation must occur in both processing and dissemination.  
However, the DoD does not have a robust system like the USN 
JCTD process for these areas.  A Joint Lessons Learned 
System (JLLS) provides a means to share improvement ideas, 
but it lacks an academically acceptable methodology for 
evaluating ideas.  The DoD also lacks a structured process 
to predict interaction of system changes on the whole ISR 
process.  The answer for this concern can be found in 
Business Process Modeling (BPM). By utilizing software and 
methods from the private sector, the DoD can create a more 
structured means to improve both processing and 
dissemination, as well as, predict performance of the 
entire ISR process. 
D. SCOPE 
BAE Systems has submitted the Joint Multi Mission 
Electro-Optic System (JMMES) for consideration as a 
solution to the military challenge of identifying difficult 
to detect objects, such as submarines, mines, IEDs, 
persons, surface vessels, and camouflaged objects. JMMES 
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leverages computer-processing power and multi-spectral 
imaging (MSI) in the detection of targets.   The multi-
sensor turret operating in the EO/IR spectrums, coupled 
with advanced algorithms, facilitates automated detection, 
tracking, and targeting.  This thesis will be limited to 
the effects JMMES will have on the maritime ISR process, 
particularly in the littoral regions. 
E. THESIS INTENT 
The JCTD process seeks to apply a methodical process 
evaluate proposed technologies. However, there is no 
requirement for the JCTD process to analyze how the new 
technology will affect existing process of the system into 
which it is introduced. A challenge for U.S. Department of 
the Navy (DoN) is to improve detection performance while 
maintaining or improving the capabilities of the ISR 
system.  The DoD’s goal is to increase quality and quantity 
of ISR available, without increasing costs or manpower 
requirements, by utilizing systems that have multi-mission 
capabilities. 
By applying survey research and deterministic modeling 
approach, an understanding of the impacts of the JMMES on 
the existing Maritime ISR system can be developed. 
This thesis will answer two questions: 
 How does JMMES' performance of maritime ISR 
mission compare to fielded systems? 
 
 How will the addition of JMMES to manned 
Aircraft Systems impact the current performance 




JMMES is not expected to conduct independent wide-area 
search; rather, it provides higher resolution 
identification, precision location and tracking based on 
cueing data.  Any aircraft system outfitted with JMMES will 
have cueing provided by a radar system.  JMMES will be 
employed on H-60 variants.  As there is potential for 
future installation onboard UAS, that is not within the 
scope of this thesis. 
G. GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDING 
The BPM presented in Chapter IV is based on 
independent operations of a U.S. ship operating in the 
littorals. 
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I  Introduction 
Chapter II Academic and Technology Review 
Chapter III Data Collection and Analysis 
Chapter IV Maritime ISR Modeling and Analysis 
Chapter V  Conclusion and Recommendations 
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II. ACADEMIC AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
A. TRANSITION OF NAVAL WARFARE 
Due to the operational successes of both carrier and 
submarine based warfare in World War II, the United States 
had grown accustomed to conducting maritime operations 
against a known and traditional enemy, specifically a large 
nation-state with an industrial economy, capable of 
sustaining and employing a blue-water Naval fleet.  While 
the United States continued to improve its capabilities, 
incorporating nuclear powered surface and subsurface 
platforms, the fundamental principle of operations remained 
constant.  While the U.S. Army and Air Force were focused 
on security challenges ashore, the Navy focused on maritime 
challenges, particularly blue-water challenges, on the open 
ocean.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
ensuing decline in communism at the end of the millennium, 
the United States was forced to re-examine its maritime 
posture, as there no longer existed a capable and equal 
adversary to challenge U.S. blue-water dominance.5   
One idea developed in this time of re-examination was 
the concept of “network-centric” warfare (NCW).  This 
concept was born in the mid-1990s, when then vice-chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens, 
published a paper on a system-of-systems in the Institute 
for National Security Studies (INSS).  This system-of-
systems concept integrated three elements:  
                     
5 Loren Thompson, Lexington Institute, “Littoral Combat Ship and the 
Birth of a New Navy” (comments given April 26, 2007) 
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/81683/lcs-leads-
revolution-in-naval-warfare.html, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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(1) sensors, satellites, radars, and remote acoustic 
devices; 
(2) computer and communication systems; 
(3) modern precision guided weapons.6   
 
It merged and combined the concepts of command and 
control (C2), surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, 
and targeting capabilities.   
In 1996, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) released 
Joint Vision 2010, in which they presented the new military 
concept of full spectrum dominance (FSD), the next 
iteration of Owens’ concept. FSD was christened as the “key 
characteristic for our armed forces in the 21st century.”7  
FSD was described as the United States military’s ability 
to dominate the battle space throughout the spectrum that 
exists from peace operations to the application of full 
military power.  Key to the FSD concept is the idea of 
information superiority, similarly supported by the system 
of systems concept.   
Over the next two years, the system-of-systems concept 
and FSD continued to evolve into what is now known as NCW.  
NCW seeks to translate an information advantage into a 
competitive war-fighting advantage through the robust 
networking of dispersed forces.8  However, in response to 
perceived diminishing global threats, military spending was 
                     
6 Christopher Sterling, Military Communications: From Ancient Times 
to the 21st Century (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 434. 
7 John Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 
1996, 2. 
8 Arthur Cebrowski, “The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,” 
Office of Force Transformation/Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2005, 4.  
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gradually reduced throughout the 1990s.  As seen in Table 
1, military spending, as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), dropped 42% over the decade from 1990 to 
2000.  As a result, NCW remained a future concept 
throughout the 1990s and was never fully adopted or 
implemented. 
 














Table 1.   U.S. Military Spending as a Percentage of 
Discretionary Spending9 
 
The events of September 11, 2001, forced the United 
States to quickly move forward from a decade of declining 
funding and examine the required technological innovation 
and change to successfully combat a new enemy.  The death 
of 3,000 Americans in an attack against two symbols of 
                     
9 Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, “Outlays by 
Superfunction and Function,” http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-
relative-size.php#ref-1, accessed 15 September 2009.  
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American military and economic strength awakened U.S. 
military and political leadership to an emerging threat and 
forced it to the forefront. 
The threat of terrorism was not new to the United 
States and existed concurrently with the military funding 
decline throughout the 1990s, as acts of terrorism were 
sprinkled throughout the decade.  Seventeen Sailors died 
when terrorists attacked the USS COLE, which had stopped to 
refuel at a Yemeni port in October 2000.  Other terrorist 
actions against U.S. interests and personnel include the 
1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 1996 
Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia, and the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing.  In August 1996, a relatively unknown 
terrorist, Osama bin Laden, declared war on the United 
States through an Islamic fatwa, or Islamic religious 
opinion/edict.  This was broadened in February 1998, with a 
second fatwa calling on all Muslims to kill Americans and 
their allies.10  All of which came to a head with the tragic 
events of September 11. 
The United States found itself confronted by a new 
enemy utilizing non-traditional tactics and was faced with 
the reality that an evolution in military tactics, 
operations, strategy, and philosophy would be required to 
successfully defeat this threat.  While still having to 
maintain the capability to fight a conventional, mass-on-
mass war, the United States would also need to further 
develop an unconventional force to successfully combat 
terrorist and insurgent threats.  These groups were highly 
                     
10 Osama Bin laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans 
Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” Al Quds Al Arabi, August 
1996.   
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networked organizations utilizing asymmetric and irregular 
forms of warfare engagement.  As such, an equally irregular 
and networked force would be required to successfully 
combat them. 
From a maritime perspective, these new threats 
presented a variety of challenges.  First, their asymmetric 
nature meant they could challenge the United States where 
it was weak, vice the traditional naval engagement model of 
strength on strength.  Second, the adversary was relatively 
weak in resources and high-powered weaponry.  While this 
does not initially appear a challenge to confront, under 
further examination, it becomes clear.  Due to limited 
indigenous resources, these groups relied heavily on 
commercial technology and adapted it to their needs.  Their 
use of the internet and commercially available 
communication devices predicated their networked approach 
and their lack of advanced weaponry and platforms led to 
their resultant limited geographical focus.  Also, these 
groups did not possess significant operational capability 
on the high seas.  Rather, they focused their efforts in 
the littoral regions, where population, commerce, and 
marine traffic were the densest.11  The Navy was left with a 
difficult problem: the need to address the aforementioned 
littoral, brown-water problem while maintaining the 
capability and readiness for traditional blue-water 
operations. 
                     
11 Loren Thompson, Lexington Institute, “Littoral Combat Ship and the 
Birth of a New Navy,” (comments given 26 April 2007) 
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/81683/lcs-leads-
revolution-in-naval-warfare.html, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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The Navy could see a broader array of responsibility 
and mission areas for the fleet operating in littoral areas 
but was confronted with the question of how to properly 
reorganize forces and develop strategy to operate 
successfully in the littoral regions.  While the Navy was 
not ready to rule out deploying large warships to support 
these littoral operations, it was obvious that these were 
not the ideal platforms to conduct the needed operations.  
Rather, there was a need for a new, agile platform, 
designed specifically for operations in the shallow, 
crowded, and challenging littoral regions.  Utilizing the 
fundamental principles of NCW, these new ships would reduce 
the threat to larger warships as they conducted highly 
networked and responsive operations against this new 
adversary.  Thus, the rightfully named Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) was born. 
B. LITTORAL OPERATIONS 
In this section, we will examine specific challenges 
and threats that exist in the littoral regions.  
Additionally, we will examine the primary maritime and 
maritime-based manned-airborne platform to be utilized in 
this environment. 
1. Threats in Littoral Regions 
Compared to operations on the open seas, conducting 
operations within the littoral regions of the world creates 
a unique set of challenges and threats.  Often, these 
challenges are predicated by the close proximity to land, 
restricted operating water depths, and high 
traffic/restricted maneuver areas of the littoral regions.  
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These challenges consist of piracy, terrorist attacks, 
swarm tactics, and littoral ASW operations.   
a. Piracy 
One significant littoral threat that has received 
a great deal of media coverage as of late is piracy.  
Maritime piracy is defined by the United Nations as “any 
criminal act of violence, detention, or depredation 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of 
a private ship or aircraft that is directed on the high 
seas against another ship, aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board a ship or aircraft.”12  Various other 
definitions exist, but can be compiled to convey piracy as 
of acts of kidnapping, robbery, murder, seizure, and 
sabotage. 
Maritime piracy focused against commercial 
transport vessels is a significant international concern 
due to the globalization and interconnectedness of the 
world economy.  Over 50,000 ships transit international 
waterways annually and it is estimated that over $13 
billion dollars are lost each year due to pirate actions.13  
Common areas traditionally vulnerable to piracy include the 
Red Sea, Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa, and the Strait of 
Malacca.  Modern piracy techniques include agile, 
networked, small boats focusing their efforts on shipping 
                     
12 Article 101, Section 1, Part VII, United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982. 
13 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, 
November 2004. 
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lanes in narrow bodies of water and constrained areas.14  
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) maintains 
statistics on pirate attacks and reports a continual rising 
trend in piracy, with 2007 numbers up 10% (263 attacks) 
over the previous year and attacks that injured commercial 
crewmembers up 300% from 2006.15 
Over 200 years ago, the United States was forced 
to deploy its fledgling Navy to the Mediterranean to combat 
piracy and commercial raiding in what is now referred to as 
the Barbary Wars.  This was the first successful attempt of 
a young republic to protect both its citizens and its 
economic interests from a ruthless and unconventional enemy 
overseas in a foreign littoral region.  The United States 
finds itself in a similar situation today, but unlike the 
pirates of the 19th century who sought quick commercial 
gain, pirates today consist of maritime terrorists with 
their own ideological bent and political agenda, in 
addition to those seeking commercial windfall.  However, 
contrary to popular public misconception, pirates today are 
not merely “riff-raff” in a rowboat, but rather well-
trained and networked fighters aboard high-powered speed 
boats, equipped with modern technology and weaponry, to 
include satellite phones and global positioning systems 
(GPS), as well as automatic weapons.16 
                     
14 Nick Rankin, “British Broadcasting Corporation, “History of 
Piracy,” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2008/03/080303_pirates_
prog2.shtml, accessed 15 September 2009. 
15 Robert Elliot, “Eastern Inscrutability: Piracy on the High Seas,” 
Security Management, June 2007.  
16 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, 
November 2004.  
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Considering the significant American dependence 
on international trade, as well as the dependence on 
foreign oil and gas shipped via commercial maritime routes, 
the United States is forced to develop an equally highly 
technical and networked force to combat piracy and protect 
commercial interests. 
b. Maritime Terrorist Activity 
The October 2000 attack on USS COLE, while 
harbored in the Port of Aden, Yemen, and the subsequent 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have increased 
awareness and discussion on the possibility of maritime 
terrorist attacks against both commercial and military 
targets.  Closely linked to the aforementioned concept of 
piracy, maritime terrorist activity differs from piracy in 
motive and, often times, in final outcome.  While piracy 
actions occur for monetary or political gain, maritime 
terrorist activity is rooted in the furtherance of 
ideological philosophy, specifically the use of terror as a 
means of coercion.  In a practical sense, while pirates 
would hold a ship and crew hostage to receive monetary 
compensation or political leverage, terrorist action would 
aim to cripple or destroy the ship and crew in an attempt 
to spread fear and terror. 
After September 11, 2001, the commercial shipping 
industry increased prevention efforts: verifying the 
contents of containers and ensuring their security, 
identifying and screening crewmembers working on maritime 
platforms, and engaging in ongoing discussions regarding 
shipping regulations for various chemical and biological 
weapons.  These combined actions led to the creation of the 
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International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 
in an attempt to provide international oversight and 
partnership against maritime terrorism.17  However, mere 
policy proved to be insufficient.  
In October 2002, the Limburg, a 300,000 ton 
tanker, was attacked off the coast of Yemen by a small boat 
full of explosives, killing one crewmember and spilling 
almost 100,000 barrels of crude oil into the ocean.18  This 
attack highlighted the challenge that maritime terrorists 
present, as large, lumbering commercial vessels do not 
possess the speed or agility required to avoid attack from 
small, agile craft. 
Not all maritime terrorism is focused on large, 
commercial craft.  As the attack on USS COLE demonstrated, 
military vessels are susceptible to terrorist attack, 
especially while pier side or at anchorage.  Additionally, 
smaller scale commercial shipping is also at risk.  In 
February 2004, Motor Vessel (MV) Superferry 14, a 
commercial ferry carrying almost 900 passengers, exploded 
in the waters surrounding the Philippines, directly outside 
Manila Bay.  With 116 deaths and over 300 wounded, it was 
one of the most gruesome terrorist actions in the Pacific 
in the new millennium.  The radical extremist terrorist 
organization known as the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) took 
responsibility for the attack, citing the attack as 
“revenge” for the murder of one of their organization’s 
members, as well as a warning against the “ongoing 
                     
17 Graham Ong-Webb, Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, and Securing the 




violence” aimed against them.  ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani 
attempted to further foster the fear and terror of the 
Filipino public, by saying the “best action of ASG was yet 
to come.”19 
While differing in tonnage, type, cargo, and 
flagging, one key commonality between the maritime 
terrorist attacks on the USS COLE, MV Superferry, and 
Limburg was their physical geographical location at the 
time of attack.  For all three ships, the attacks occurred 
not on the open ocean, but rather closer to shore, in the 
littorals.  These regions present a significant security 
challenge against maritime terrorist threat. 
c. Swarm Tactics 
The concepts of swarming and swarm tactics are 
tied closely to both the aforementioned areas of piracy and 
maritime terrorist activity.  Swarming is, in general 
terms, behavior where a group of individual units work and 
move as a coordinated whole.  As the name alludes, the 
behavior is seen in the natural world in insects, but has 
been adopted for tactical military engagement.  This 
military swarming can be further defined as a “scheme of 
maneuver that involves the convergent attack of five (or 
more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted 
force in some particular place.  Convergent implies an 
attack from most of the points on the compass.”20 
                     
19 Peter Lehr and Rommel Banlaoi, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age 
of Global Terrorism (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2007), 121. 
20 Sean Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and 
Future (RAND 2000), 2.  
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Used predominantly in a tactical situation, 
swarming is an asymmetric technique utilized by a lesser 
force against a greater force, where the sum of the 
combined efforts of numerous elements of the lesser force 
is able to overcome the more capable foe.  The key to a 
successful swarm operation is the continued development and 
utilization of communication and information networks.  To 
combat this type of tactic, a similarly agile, responsive, 
and networked collection of platforms must be employed 
against the adversary in the littoral region.  Falling 
directly in line with the NBW concept, the 
interconnectedness and robust information sharing 
capability are vital to successfully combating swarm 
techniques. 
In January 2008, five Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
(IRG) fast-boats conducted a variation of traditional swarm 
tactics against three U.S. warships operating in the 
Straits of Hormuz.  The five Iranian vessels maneuvered 
against the U.S. ships in ways described by a Pentagon 
official as “careless, reckless, and potentially hostile.”  
Vice Admiral Cosgriff, U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet Commander, 
deemed the IRG actions as “unduly provocative” and 
expounded further saying the U.S. ships “received a radio 
call that was threatening in nature, to the effect that 
they were closing on our ships and ... the U.S. ships would 
explode.”21  The IRG has been designated as a weapons 
proliferator, as well as a supporter of terrorist activity.  
While no attacks were made against the U.S. warships, the 
unconventional swarm techniques used by the IRG received 
                     
21 Andrew Gray, “Iranians Threatened U.S. Ships in Hormuz,” Reuters, 
7 January 2008. 
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international attention and demonstrated the potential risk 
that existed for ships in the Arabian Gulf and in littoral 
regions world-wide. 
d. Littoral ASW Operations 
The last significant littoral threat and 
challenge we will examine is the subsurface and ASW 
operations within the littoral.  In the context of U.S. 
joint-force operations, “successful littoral ASW clears the 
undersea battle-space of hostile submarine influence and 
permits American and combined forces to maneuver at will to 
best employ their assets at the time and place of their 
choosing.”22  The importance of a littoral ASW capability 
cannot be overstated.  It is essential to maintain the 
capability to protect naval assets, as well as commercial 
and logistic shipping, from the threat of potential enemy 
submarines.  Maintaining this capability allows the United 
States to “project power ashore, conduct strategic sealift 
operations, and control or interdict sea lines of 
communications (SLOCs) that affect littoral objectives.”23 
ASW techniques, practices, and systems employed 
in the open ocean are not necessarily successful in the 
littoral regions. Due to high surface traffic volume, 
geographical bounding, bathymetric challenges, and relative 
stealth of subsurface platforms operating in the area, 
littoral ASW operations require a different approach, from 
both a tactics and systems standpoint.  The littorals 
                     
22 Navy Doctrine Command, “Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare Concept,”  




present a complex and acoustically noisy environment that 
confuses and undermines standard blue-water ASW sensors.  
As such, successful ASW operations in these areas rely more 
heavily on non-acoustic sensors to aid in detection and 
tracking of subsurface targets.  According to U.S. Navy 
doctrine on littoral ASW, “the accelerating rate of 
technological innovation gives increasing advantages to the 
navies that most quickly introduce appropriate new 
technologies into their fleets.”24 
2. Maritime Littoral Platforms 
For the purpose of this thesis, we will focus 
attention on the LCS and the direct implementation of its 
indigenous ISR assets.  While other surface platforms, 
including frigates, cruisers, and destroyers, are capable 
of operations within the littorals, it is not their primary 
designed functionality.  Additionally, while the potential 
exists for UAV assets in conjunction with the LCS, the 
scope of this thesis will focus on the manned aircraft 
available due to resource limitation in the field-testing 
environment.  Further discussion of applicability to 
unmanned assets can be found in Chapter IV, under future 
recommendations.  The focus of the analysis in this thesis 
is on the sensors employed by the maritime aircraft, but we 
will first present a baseline understanding of the 
platforms themselves. 
a. LCS  
In November 2001, the DoN announced a revised 
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the future surface 
                     
24 Navy Doctrine Command, “Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare Concept.”   
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combatants program.  Re-coined DD(X) from its original DD 
21 moniker, this revised request included three platforms, 
a modified guided missile cruiser and multi-mission 
destroyer, tentatively named CG(X) and DD(X) respectively, 
and the LCS.25 The inclusion of the LCS alongside the CG(X) 
and DD(X) in the revision marked a tangible mind-shift in 
planning for twenty-first century naval operations.  Only a 
year prior, Congress was provided a report outlining the 
Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, in which the potential 
contribution of small combatants in future operations was 
downplayed and the smallest discussed surface platform was 
over three times the size of current LCS designs.26 
After the decision was made to fund the future 
LCS program on the conceptual level, many questions still 
abounded as to the direction of the program and 
requirements for the specific platforms.  In July 2002, the 
Naval War College (NWC) released the results of an 18-month 
series of workshops and discussions, pulling from their 
broad knowledge base of indigenous staff and students to 
develop desirable characteristics and requirements of an 
ideal littoral surface platform.  Their list contained 
eight main focus areas: 
 
1. be capable of networking with other 
platforms and sensors; 
2. be useful across the spectrum of conflict; 
                     
25 Aykut Kurtman, Evaluation of the Littoral Combat Ship (Monterey: 
NPS Thesis, 2006). 
26 Robert Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship 
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
2004). 
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3. be able to contribute to a sustained, 
forward naval presence; 
4. be capable of supporting manned vertical 
lift aircraft; 
5.  be capable of operating with reduced 
manning; 
6.  have an open architecture and modularity; 
7.  be capable of controlling manned and 
unmanned vehicles; 
8.  have organic self-defense capabilities.27 
 
Over the next two years, this list and other 
requirements for the LCS were refined through a number of 
studies of current and potential threats, as well as 
analyses of future military operations in the littoral 
regions.  From these, the U.S. Navy developed finalized 
requirements for the LCS that addressed the identified 
capabilities desired and threats in the littorals.  The LCS 
would be a modular ship, capable of supporting mine 
warfare, ASW, and SUW modules, as primary mission areas. 28 
Additionally, LCS would also need to be capable of 
conducting numerous secondary missions such as ISR, MIO, 
humanitarian missions, and special operations support.  The 
aim was for a small, agile, flexible, multi-mission capable 
ship with the ability to operate both independently and 
within a network of others, to enhance U.S. Naval 
capability within the littoral regions.  Specifically, the 
2004 Interface Control Document (ICD) for the LCS stated: 
                     
27 Aykut Kurtman, Evaluation of the Littoral Combat Ship (Monterey: 
NPS Thesis, 2006). 
28 Ibid. 
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The LCS platform shall be designed to accommodate 
multiple reconfigurable modular mission packages 
to accomplish focused missions via an open and 
modular design that provides flexibility and ease 
of upgrade while ensuring rapid and successful 
installation and integration of the mission 
packages to the platform. To permit use of a wide 
range of both present and future mission systems 
and to permit platform and mission systems to be 
developed independently, a standard interface in 
the form of a standard technical architecture 
must be used. The industry shall design and build 
the LCS platform, employing an open modular 
architecture for mission systems based on this 
standard technical architecture. Separately, 
mission modules will be developed for the LCS 
based on this technical architecture. 29 
In May 2004, the U.S. Navy awarded contracts to 
two competing companies for the initial four ships of the 
LCS Class.  Lockheed Martin Corporation was awarded 46 
million dollars to build LCS 1 and LCS 3, while General 
Dynamics was awarded 78 million dollars to build LCS 2 and 
LCS 4.  The specific design of the LCS platform varied 
distinctly between the two companies.   
The Lockheed Martin design was based on its 
advanced steel mono-hull and the General Dynamics design 
was based on a more nontraditional “trimaran” hull.  While 
different in appearance, both designs were to meet the 
performance requirements as laid out by the Navy.  Both 
designs could achieve sprint speeds of over 40 knots as 
well as long-range transit distances of over 3,500 miles. 
The sea frames of each design could accommodate the 
equipment and crews of the focus mission packages and 
effectively launch, recover, and control unmanned vehicles 
                     
29 Naval Sea Systems, Draft interface control document, 2004. 
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for extended periods of time in various sea states, though 
the methods by which each launch and recover aircraft and 
waterborne craft are different.30  After the development and 
initial deployment of these four vessels, the Navy’s plan 
was to determine the optimal characteristics in each design 
and include those characteristics in the planned 55-ship 
class.  Figures 2 and 3 show the conceptual briefing slide 
and picture of the LCS 1, while Figures 4 and 5 provide the 
same for LCS 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   LCS 1 Briefing Slide31 
                     
30 GlobalSecurity.Org, “Littoral Combat Ship,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs.htm, accessed 
15 September 2009. 
31 Image Shack Online Media Hosting, ”Littoral Combat Ship-1,” 




Figure 3.   LCS 1 at Sea (head on)32 
 
 
Figure 4.   LCS 2 Briefing Slide33 
                     
32 New Wars, Word Press.com, “LCS Littoral Combat Ship-1,” 
http://newwars.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/lcs1.jpg, accessed 15 
September 2009. 
33 Defense Industry Daily, “General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship,” 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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Figure 5.   LCS 2 (head-on)34 
 
Since the awarding of the initial contracts, the 
entire LCS program has seen a great deal of criticism.  In 
June 2005, the Lockheed Martin LCS 1 was named FREEDOM and 
her keel was laid in Marinette, Wisconsin.  In January 
2006, the General Dynamics LCS 2 was named INDEPENDENCE and 
her keel was laid in Mobile, Alabama.  However, in April 
2007, the Navy canceled the contract with Lockheed Martin 
for LCS 3 and followed suit seven months later with General 
Dynamics, cancelling the contract for LCS 4. 35 36    
Though the Navy cited significant cost overruns 
as the driving factor behind the contract cancellations, 
the need for the LCS did not wane.  In public comments 
following the contract cancellations, the Secretary of the 
                     
34 Strategy Page, “Littoral Combat Ship-2,” 
http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/2008120422651.aspx?comments
=Y, accessed 15 September 2009. 
35 Rene Merle, “Navy Cancels Lockheed Ship Deal,” Washington Post, 13 
April 2007. 
36 U.S. Navy Press Release No. 1269-07, “Navy Terminates Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS 4) Contract,” 1 November 2007. 
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Navy (SECNAV), the Honorable Donald Winter, stated, “LCS 
continues to be a critical war-fighting requirement for our 
Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic 
choke points around the world.”37  The Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead was in the same 
accord, stating, “I am absolutely committed to the Littoral 
Combat Ship. We need this ship. It is very important that 
our acquisition efforts produce the right littoral combat 
ship capability to the fleet at the right cost.”38  
In April 2008, the Navy re-engaged with both 
General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin, requesting new 
proposals for future LCS platforms.39  The Navy agreed to a 
new contract for LCS 3 with Lockheed Martin in March 2009 
and for LCS 4 with General Dynamics in May 2009.40   
In the months following this announcement, there 
have been various other public statements from 
congressional oversight committees and defense analysts 
regarding contract caps, cost over-runs, and even some 
critics calling to cancel the program all together.  But, 
for the foreseeable future, the LCS development program 
will continue, with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
reiterating that the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget will 
include three LCS platforms with the plan for up to 55 
                     
37 U.S. Navy Press Release No. 1269-07, “Navy Terminates Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS 4) Contract,” 1 November 2007. 
38 Ibid. 
39 David Sharp, “Navy Restarting Contest for Halted Shipbuilding Program,” 
Washington Post, 03 April 2008. 
40 National Briefin, “Lockheed Gets Second Ship Deal,” Washington Post, 24 
March 2009. 
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littoral platforms in the future.41  This continued 
expressed commitment to the LCS program highlights the DON 
and DoD leadership’s emphasis on flexible, multi-mission 
capable platforms. 
Both the Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics 
versions of the LCS platform are equipped with both a 
helicopter flight deck and hangar, capable of storing both 
manned rotary wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.  
The primary manned maritime aircraft for use onboard the 
LCS will be variants of the SH-60 Seahawk. 
b. SH-60 Seahawk 
The Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk is a twin turbo-shaft 
engine, multi-mission helicopter in current use by the U.S. 
Navy.  The Navy selected the Seahawk to replace the aging 
SH-2 Sea Sprite in 1978 and took possession of the first 
aircraft in 1983.  As continued improvements were made to 
the Navy’s Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) 
avionics suite, the Sea Sprite did not possess the 
endurance or lift capability to support the required 
equipment of LAMPS Mk II and III.42  The Seahawk is able to 
deploy on any air-capable surface ship, including frigates, 
destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and amphibious 
ships, as well as the new LCS class.  The Seahawk has 
traditionally existed in four main designations, SH-60B, 
SH-60F, MH-60S, and HH-60H, encompassing various specific  
 
                     
41 Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates,” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396, 
accessed 15 September 2009. 
42 Ray Leoni, Black Hawk: The Story of a World Class Helicopter 
(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2007).    
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mission areas, including ASW, SUW, SAR, CSAR, transport, 
logistics, vertical replenishment (VERTREP), and medical 
evacuation (MEDEVAC).43   
The SH-60B LAMPS Mk III variant is primarily 
deployed aboard frigates, destroyers, and cruisers, and 
primarily provides an ASW and SUW capability.  The SH-60F 
LAMPS Mk III variant is the aircraft carrier based version 
of the SH-60B, having replaced the SH-3 Sea King as the 
Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) primary ASW and SUW asset, 
though other variants can also deploy and operate from an 
aircraft carrier as well.   
While the SH-60B is equipped with a towed 
Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) and sonabouy capability, 
the SH-60F variant is equipped with the AQS-13F dipping 
sonar, improving its acoustic ASW capability compared to 
the SH-60B.44  The U.S. Navy is currently in the midst of 
converting all SH-60Bs and then SH-60Fs into a combined, 
multi-mission SH-60R platform.  The new SH-60R variant 
provides: 
 Upgraded mission and flight displays 
 Improved advanced flight control computer 
 RADAR upgrade 
 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) upgrade 
 Improved integrated self defense 
 Dipping sonar upgrade 
                     
43 U.S. Navy Fact File, “SH-60 Seahawk Helicopter,”  
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1200&tid=500&ct=1, 
accessed 15 September 2009. 
44 Paul Eden, Encyclopedia of Modern Military Aircraft/Sikorsky H-60 
Sea Hawk (Amber Books, 2004), 431. 
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The SH-60R will have the ability to operate from 
all helicopter capable surface platforms and will be the 
SH-60 variant primarily used on LCS.45  Additionally, the 
SH-60R will incorporate non-mission specific avionics 
within its new “glass-cockpit” to facilitate the multi-
mission capability of the airframe.  A “glass-cockpit” 
features electronic instrument displays driven by a flight 
management system (FMS), where traditional cockpit design 
uses numerous mechanical gauges to display information.  
This simplifies aircraft operation and navigation, allowing 
pilots and aircrewmen to focus predominantly on pertinent 
information.  Specifically, it will allow the same pilot to 
shift from an ASW mission to a SUW or cargo transport 
mission in the same airframe with the same cockpit 
configuration.  The extended platform and mission 
flexibility afforded by this cockpit reconfiguration aligns 
under the broad mission set needed for operations within 
the littorals. 
Two other variants of the SH-60 are the MM-60S 
and the HH-60H.  The MM-60S replaces the H-46 within the 
naval aviation inventory and will serve primarily as a 
VERTREP, logistics, and transport platform, with a 
secondary SAR mission.  The HH-60H variant is specifically 
figured for Combat SAR (CSAR) and navy special warfare 
(NSW) support.  For the scope of this thesis, we will limit 
focus to the new SH-60R variant, as it will comprise the 
majority of manned maritime rotary winged aircraft used in 
littoral operations. 
                     
45 Lockheed Martin, “MH-60 Helicopter Departs Lockheed Martin to 
Complete First Operational Navy Squadron,” Lockheed Martin Press 
Release, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2008/0730si-
mh-60r.html, accessed 15 September 2009.  
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Traditionally, SH-60B variant was deployed on the 
smaller surface combatants with the SH-60F and MM-60S 
conducting operations from the aircraft carrier.  The SH-60 
footprint in a Navy CSG was two SH-60Bs onboard a cruiser, 
two SH-60Bs on a destroyer, one SH-60B on a frigate, and 
four SH-60Fs and four HH-60Hs onboard the aircraft carrier.  
While the number of ships within the CSG is not static and 
can change, a 14 SH-60 variant presence was common across 
all surface platforms within the CSG.  As the SH-60B and 
SH-60F are replaced by the multi-mission SH-60R, the new 
SH-60 footprint with the CSG will be comprised of four MH-
60R and eight MM-60S variants onboard the aircraft carrier, 
with two SH-60R variants onboard the cruiser and destroyer 
respectively and one SH-60R variant on the frigate.  This 
new planned deployment will increase the total number of 
SH-60 variants in the strike group and will provide nine 
multi-mission capable helicopters for the CSG commander.46  
The LCS has the capability to deploy with up to two SH-60 
variants.  Figures 6 and 7 show a picture and schematic 
drawing of the SH-60 Seahawk. 
 
 
                     
46 Email Exchange with Peter Yu, Seahawk Wing Training Instructor,  




Figure 6.   SH-60 Seahawk in Flight47 
 
Figure 7.   Schematic Drawing of SH-60 Seahawk48 
                     
47 Aerospace Web.org, “SH-60 Sea Hawk,” www.aerospaceweb.org, 
accessed 15 September 2009. 
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C. MARITIME ISR 
According to DoD Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, ISR is 
an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning 
and operation of sensors and assets, as well as the 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information 
in direct support of current and future operations.49  It 
refers to the sets of collection and processing systems and 
associated operations involved in acquiring and analyzing 
information about a given target.    
The JP further defines the three ISR components 
individually: 
 Intelligence—the product resulting from the 
collection, processing, integration, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign nations, hostile 
or potentially hostile forces or elements, or 
areas of actual or potential operations.  
 Surveillance—the systematic observation of 
aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, 
persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, 
photographic, or other means. 
 Reconnaissance—a mission undertaken to obtain, by 
visual observation or other detection methods, 
information about the activities and resources of 
an enemy or adversary.50 
Intelligence is broader and more encompassing, while 
surveillance refers to systematic observation of a targeted 
area or group over a short or extended time, and  
 
                     
48 Aerospace Web.org, “3-view schematic,” www.aerospaceweb.org, 
accessed 15 September 2009. 
49 U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. 
50  Ibid. 
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reconnaissance refers to an effort or a mission to acquire 
information about a target and can mean a one-time 
endeavor. 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently 
compiled information on DoD ISR operations, providing a 
very succinct overview of ISR operations.  They surmised: 
ISR functions are principal elements of U.S. 
defense capabilities, and include a wide variety 
of systems for acquiring and processing 
information needed by national security decision-
makers and military commanders.  ISR systems 
range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting 
satellites.  Some collect basic information for a 
wide range of analytical products; others are 
designed to acquire data for specific weapons 
systems. Some are ‘national’ systems intended 
primarily to collect information of interest to 
Washington-area agencies; others are ‘tactical’ 
systems intended to support military commanders 
on the battlefield.51 
For the scope of this thesis, we will focus on 
indigenous Maritime ISR (MISR) operations.  As the name 
indicates, MISR is ISR operations in the maritime 
environment.  Indigenous MISR refers to those ISR 
operations launched from a maritime platform in support of 
that platform’s operations, or indigenous to the platform.  
Specifically, we are evaluating LCS-based, SH-60 variant, 
rotary-wind aircraft outfitted with various sensor packages 
conducting indigenous maritime ISR in the littorals.  We 
will first examine the MISR process as a singular system,  
 
 
                     
51 Richard Best, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
Programs: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 
February 2005. 
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then focus on the system-of-systems that make-up the 
process, and then look at the indigenous assets conducting 
MISR.   
1. Intelligence Cycle and ISR Process 
Maritime ISR is a hybrid combination of the 
traditional Intelligence Cycle (IC) and traditional ISR 
process.  The IC is defined as “the process by which 
information is converted into intelligence and made 
available to users.”52  IC methodology consists of six 
interrelated operations: planning and direction, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and 
production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation 
and feedback.  Figure 8 graphically depicts the IC, with 
return “evaluation arrows” representing the process 
evaluation that occurs after product production.  The 
product created from the IC is evaluated, and either deemed 
satisfactory (thus staying on the outside circle), or it is 
determined that either a new plan/task or further 
collection is needed, and the cycle returns back to revisit 
those specific areas in the IC process.   
 
                     
52 U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. 
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Figure 8.   Intelligence Process Cycle53 
 
Figure 8 shows the ISR doctrinal methodology (IDM) as 
compared to the IC methodology.  IDM consists of nine 
interrelated operations: commander’s guidance, user’s 
requirements, plan, task/re-task, collect, analyze, 
disseminate, evaluate, and apply.  Like the IC methodology, 
there is a continual feedback arrow, allow refining, 
redefinition, and re-tasking throughout the ISR operation. 
 
                     
53 Global Security.Org, “The Intelligence Process,” 
www.globalsecurity.org, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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Figure 9.   ISR Doctrinal Methodology54 
 
2. Maritime ISR Methodology 
By examining each individual operation of the IDM in 
conjunction with the components of the IC, we are able to 
determine the specific operations that are part of 
indigenous maritime ISR operations. 
IDM components of Commander’s Guidance and User’s 
Requirements are the foundation of an ISR operation and are 
a precursor to entering the circle on the IC model (Figure 
9).  In this stage, the actual requirement is determined 
based on threat, operations, or intelligence need (IN).  
These requirements are prioritized based on various 
aspects, to include timeliness, current situation, and 
relevancy.   
                     
54 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-9, Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Operations, 17 July 2007. 
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In the planning and task/re-task phases, available 
assets to conduct MISR operations are vetted against the 
requirements determined in the previous stage.  Working 
from the requirement priority list, assets are allocated 
and tasked to the various requirements.  These first four 
stages are pre-cursors to the MISR operation itself; in the 
case of this thesis, that is synonymous with launching the 
SH-60 variant aircraft. 
Actual MISR operations begin with the collection 
phase, which actually consists of the subcomponents of 
access, detection, and collection.  Access refers to the 
ISR asset or sensor being positioned in the physical 
proximity or required location to satisfy the given 
requirement.  Access is impacted by a variety of elements, 
to include the operating environment and ISR platform 
operating limitations.   
Once it has gained access, the next subcomponent of 
collection is detection.  Detection refers to the MISR 
asset’s ability to locate and detect the desired target.  
Challenges in detection lay with the capabilities of a MISR 
sensor in conjunction with the difficulties presented by 
the desired target.  For instance, a periscope of a 
subsurface target in a high-level sea state is relatively 
difficult to locate, thus, making the detection phase more 
complicated.  Conversely, a large deck surface contact 
operating in a low sea state is an easier target to locate, 
thus an easier detection. 
Actual collection follows detection and is the 
recording and observation of the given target of interest 
by the sensor.  In the case of an EO/IR sensor, this is the 
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photographic or video recording of the target of interest.  
In the case of other sensors, this could be the recording 
of RADAR, acoustic signatures, or various other target 
parameters. 
After the successful collection of a signal or image, 
the next stage in the MISR process is analysis.  This stage 
involves human analytical capabilities as well as automated 
computer analysis, where the collected information is 
evaluated and inspected to determine usable value and what 
significance the information provides.   
From this analysis, a report is produced.  These 
reports take various forms, from the formal tactical report 
(TACREP) and product report mechanisms, to more informal 
methods of tippers, emails, and data transfers.  These 
reports are then disseminated to various customers and 
users.  The customers then evaluate the information in the 
reports and apply them to their current needs.   
Throughout the MISR cycle, there is a continual 
evaluation and feedback mechanism.  This mechanism allows 
for an ongoing process of examination of the different 
stages of the maritime ISR cycle, looking at the specific 
requirements of each stage and determining if they are 
completed satisfactorily.  If it is determined that there 
are discrepancies, failures, needed re-tasking(s), or 
refocusing required at any step within the cycle, the cycle 
can revert back to a previous stage to ensure requirements 
are successfully being met. 
MISR operations are conducted in direct support of 
various maritime operations, to include ASW, SUW, MIO, and 
SAR, and Mine Countermeasures (MCM).  Additionally, 
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maritime ISR platforms can be utilized in a non-traditional 
capacity ashore, supporting combat SAR (CSAR), overland 
SAR, counter canopy and concealment operations (CCC), 
illicit crop detection (ICD), and CIED operations. 
3. Indigenous Maritime ISR Technology and Systems 
We have previously examined the various platforms 
employed in MISR operations, looking closely at the LCS and 
SH-60 Seahawk.  In this section, we will focus on the 
various technologies and specific sensors that these 
platforms employ conducting MISR operations.  For the scope 
of this thesis, we are focused on the EO/IR capabilities 
employed by the SH-60 variant.  SONAR and RADAR 
capabilities of the SH-60 are crucial elements in the 
maritime ISR process, but they are a static capability 
creating a consistent baseline to cue the EO/IR assets we 
will discuss in the following sections.  As such, they are 
not a focus area in this thesis.  We touched on the basics 
of EO/IR sensors in Chapter I and will now look further at 
various advanced technologies and the systems that employ 
them. 
a. Multispectral Imagery 
Multispectral Imaging (MSI) is a technology that 
captures light from frequencies beyond the visible light 
range, into both the IR and ultraviolet (UV) range.  Going 
beyond the human eye capabilities of red, green, and blue, 
MSI is a combination of multiple digital images from 
multiple cameras/devices capturing images in various 
portions of the visible and IR spectra.  These MSI sensors 
look for the unique fingerprint or spectral signature that 
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an object leaves across the EM spectrum.  This spectral 
signature is what enables positive identification of the 
imaged object detected by the MSI sensors. 
MSI is steadily growing in popularity within DoD 
as a digital means for mission planning, thermal signature 
detection, and terrain analysis, as the ability to record 
spectral reflectance in different portions of the EM 
spectrum has been found useful in a number of various 
applications.55  
MSI focuses on both the visible light and IR 
portion of the EM spectrum.  The IR portion of the EM 
spectrum covers the range from 300 GHz to 400 THz and can 
further be divided into three sub-categories:  Far-IR, Mid-
IR, and Short Wave/Near-IR. 56    
Above the IR frequencies in the EM spectrum is 
the visible light range.  As the name indicates, this is 
the portion of the EM spectrum detectable by the human eye 
and is broken into subsets by color bands.  A rainbow, 
therefore, is composed of the visible light portion of the 
EM spectrum.  Theoretically, though undetectable to the 
human eye, IR frequencies fall outside the red portion of 
the rainbow, while UV radiation exists beyond the violet 
end.  Figure 10 graphically displays the ranges and 
associated frequencies of the EM spectrum, to include the 
visible light, IR, and UV ranges. 
 
                     
55 Air University, “Space Primer, Ch 12, Multispectral Imaging,” 




Figure 10.   EM Frequency Spectrum57 
 
When considering an MSI system, there are 
designated sensors for each individual band of the 
previously discussed visible light and IR range of the EM 
spectrum.  Each individual band has different detection 
capabilities and associated target sets.  The various MSI 
EM bands are outlined below and graphically depicted in 
Figure 11. 
 Band 1- Blue visible light band; used for 
soil, vegetation and coastal water mapping as 
well as atmospheric and deep water imaging.    
 
 Band 2- Green visible light band; used for 
depicting green reflectance of vegetation as 




                     
57 South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, “Electromagnetic 
Spectrum,” 
http://www.dnr.sc.gov/ael/personals/pjpb/lecture/spectrum.gif, accessed 
15 September 2009. 
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 Band 3- Red visible light band; used for 
differentiating vegetation as well as imaging 
of man-made objects and shallow water 
imaging.  
 
 Band 4- Near-IR band; used for vegetation and 
biomass surveys. 
 
 Band 5- Short Wave IR band; used for 
discriminating between liquid densities (i.e. 
oil on water) and various vegetation types, 
as well as detecting moisture content. 
 
 Band 6- Mid-IR band; used for sensing 
vegetation moisture, snow/cloud reflectance 
differences, and soil variations. 
 
 Band 7- Long Wave-IR band, also called 
Thermal IR; used for thermal mapping, 
including thermal differences in water and 
night imaging; utilizes emitted radiation 
vice reflected radiation.58   
 
 
                     
58 Air University, “Space Primer, Ch 12, Multispectral Imaging,” 
http://space.au.af.mil/primer/index.htm, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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Figure 11.   MSI EM Frequency Bands59 
 
b. Hyperspectral Imagery 
Like MSI above, Hyperspectral Imagery (HSI) also 
collects and processes information across the EM spectrum, 
from the visible light ranges to the IR and UV range.  HSI 
individually collects information as a set of images in its 
specified spectral band and then combines them to form a 
three dimensional (3D) hyperspectral cube for further 
processing and analysis.60   
MSI and HSI are similar practices of spectral 
analysis, with two significant differences.  First, is the 
                     
59 Air University, “Space Primer, Ch 12, Multispectral Imaging,” 
http://space.au.af.mil/primer/index.htm, accessed 15 September 2009. 
60 Nahum Gat, “Directions in Environmental Spectroscopy Industrial 
Trends, Hyperspectral Imaging,” Spectroscopy Showcase, March 1999. 
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number of spectral bands utilized.  MSI data contains ten 
to hundreds of bands, while HSI data contains hundreds to 
thousands of bands, a significant increase.  As a result, 
HSI products provide increased resolution and accuracy, as 
well as further detail not always detected by MSI.  Second, 
is in the methodology of data collection.  MSI data 
consists of a set of optimally selected non-contiguous 
bands, while HSI data consists of a set of contiguous 
bands.  Graphical representation of the MSI and HSI 
differences are graphically depicted in Figure 12.  It is 
clear to see the difference in number of spectral bands 




Figure 12.   MSI/HSI Comparison61 
                     
61 Federation of American Scientists, “Remote Sensing Tutorial,” 










c. EO Passive ASW System (EPAS) 
EPAS program specifications and information will 
be limited at this classification level.  This thesis is 
intentionally unclassified in its entirety, therefore only 
the basics of EPAS will be discussed and an EPAS overview 
provided in generalities. 
EPAS is a research and development (R&D), passive 
EO camera system installed within a 16-inch turret, used 
for maritime surface and subsurface imaging.  At the core 
of EPAS technology are four integrated non-acoustical 
detection technologies.  This core consists of a 12-channel 
visible multi-spectral imager, a three-channel low-level-
light spectral detector, a three-channel low-light zoom 
capable camera, and a mid-wave IR detector.62  Ultimately, 
12 individual cameras are utilized to collect the multi-
spectral data. 
EPAS technology can be installed on any airborne 
platform with a 16-inch turret mount and is currently 
employed on the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).  
Other potential future platforms for include the SH-60 
Seahawks, the P-8A follow-on multi-mission MPA, as well as 
UAVs.  EPAS technology improvement research includes 
examining ways to include polarization capabilities and 
improved processing algorithms to improve detection 
capabilities in sea foam and higher sea-states, as well as  
 
 
                     
62Navy SBIR FY2006.1, “Technology Development for a Multi-Mission 
Passive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Turret Capability,” 
http://www.navysbir.com/06_1/93.htm, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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continued research to improve overall system performance 
while reducing both the size and weight dimensions of the 
system.63 
d. AAS-44 Forward Looking Infra Red Turret 
(FLIR) 
The AAS-44 FLIR turret has been utilized onboard 
the SH-60 since 1997.  The system is a second generation 
FLIR with three fields of view: image enhancing local-area 
processing; electronic zoom, dual-mode automatic video 
tracker; and a digital video interface for aircraft-to-ship 
data-link. The sensor, coupled with a laser range-finder 
(LRF) and laser designator (LD), is installed on a six-axis 
gimbals in a nose-mounted turret aboard the airframe.64  
Developed by Raytheon, the AAS-44 provides both general 
optical surveillance capability, as well as providing line-
of-sight targeting and illumination capability for Hellfire 
and laser-guided bombs. Figure 13 shows a close-up view of 
the AAS-44 FLIR turret and Figure 14 shows the SH-60 with 
the AAS-44 installed. 
 
                     
63 63Navy SBIR FY2006.1, “Technology Development for a Multi-Mission 
Passive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Turret Capability,” 
http://www.navysbir.com/06_1/93.htm, accessed 15 September 2009. 
64 Janes International Defence Review, “Naval Helicopter Sensors and 
Weapons Systems, September 2001. 
 52
 
Figure 13.   AAS-44 FLIR Turret65 
 
 
Figure 14.   AAS-44 FLIR Turret onboard SH-60 Seahawk66 
 
The follow-on EO system to the AAS-44 is the AAS-
52, which increases the fields of view, adds color and low-
light television cameras, and includes a three-mode auto-
tracker.  The Multispectral Targeting System Bravo (MTS-B),  
 
                     
65Raytheon, “AAS-44 Data Sheet,” www.raytheon.com, accessed 15 
September 2009. 
66 GUNCOPTER.COM, “SH-60 B/F with FLIR,” www.guncopter.com/sh-60-sea-
hawk, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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a modified FLIR turret from the AAS-52 family, has been 
selected has been selected for the AAS-44 follow-on system 
onboard the SH-60 variants.67 
e. MTS-B 
Raytheon’s MTS-B is a multi-use EO/IR system 
designated as the follow-on system to the AAS-44 FLIR.  
Like its predecessor, MTS-B provides both general optical 
surveillance capability, as well as providing line-of-sight 
laser targeting, automatic video tracking (AVT), and laser 
illumination.  However, the MTS-B has an improved detection 
range, both in physical distance and capability across the 
IR spectrum, as well as improved image resolution68.  
Specifically, MTS-B incorporates seven EO and IR cameras, 
ranging from wide to ultra-narrow view with a 2:1 and 4:1 
electronic zoom capability in IR and television mode 
respectively.  Additional available options include EO 
television sensors, intensified television sensors, 
illuminator, eye safe rangefinder, and spot-tracker. 69  
Figure 15 shows the MTS-B system.   
B and for today’s military 
                     
67 Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons 
Systems (Naval Institute Press, 2006), 206. 
68 Email Exchange with Peter Yu, Seahawk Wing Training Instructor,  
HSM Weapons School Pacific, NAS North Island, CA, August 2009. 




Figure 15.   MTS-B FLIR System70 
 
f. MX-15D Wescam Turret 
L-3 Wescam produces a variety of EO/IR turrets 
employed internationally onboard multiple private and 
government manned and unmanned aircraft.  The baseline 
EO/IR turret employed with the JMMES system, the L-3 Wescam 
MX-15D, maintains the capability for multiple configuration 
and camera/sensor installation to meet custom needs of 
various customers.  Specifically, the MX-15D has the 
flexibility to install up to five of the following: 
 Color daylight camera with zoom lens 
 Mono-daylight camera with spotter lens 
 IR camera with high level magnification and 
zoom capability 
 LD / LRF capability 
 Laser illuminator71 
                     
70 Raytheon, “MTS-B Data Sheet,” www.raytheon.com, accessed 15 
September 2009. 
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System design and specific camera inclusion for 
JMMES system optimization will be discussed further in the 
JMMES section.  Figure 16 shows the L-3 Wescam MX-15D 
turret. 
 
Figure 16.   L-3 Wescam MX-15 Turret72 
 
g. JMMES EO/IR System 
JMMES is a tactical EO/IR sensor suite that 
simultaneously operates multiple EO/IR sensors while 
processing imagery using mission specified algorithms.  
JMMES is capable of performing multiple missions through 
software modifications that fully employ the baseline 
standard EPAS sensor suite.  The JMMES system consists of a 
collection of EO/IR cameras mounted in a 15-inch Wescam MX-
15-D turret, a JMMES system processor, a separately mounted 
MAD sensor, and a system operator workstation.  For our 
                     
71 Wescam, “Wescam MX-15 Family Products,” 
http://www.wescam.com/products/products_services_1.asp, accessed 15 
September 2009.  
72 Wescam, “Wescam MX-15 Family Products.”  
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testing purposes and for the scope of this thesis, the 
JMMES system utilized was not equipped with a MAD sensor 
and the operator workstation was onboard the aircraft.  
Future possible capabilities include utilizing a data link 
from the JMMES turret and processor onboard the aircraft to 
an operator workstation on the ground.73  Figure 17 shows 























Figure 17.   JMMES System Components74 
 
The 15-inch Wescam turret houses six different 
EO/IR sensors as part of the JMMES system.  Specifically, 
these sensors include an EO Wide field of view (EOW), EO 
medium field of view (EOM), EO narrow field of view (EON), 
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Mid-wave IR (MWIR) with four fields of view (narrow, short-
wave, medium, long-wave), a bioluminescence EOW low level 
light sensor, and LD / LRF.  Figure 18 shows a graphical 
display of the EO spectrum and where the various JMMES 
















Figure 18.   EM Spectrum JMMES Sensor Allocation76 
 
Within the JMMES Concept of Employment (COE) 
document, the specific sensors housed within the turret are 
discussed in extensive detail.  A summary of the sensor 
discussion is included in the following paragraphs. 
The MWIR sensor is a passive broadband sensor 
that provides the capability to detect objects emitting EM 
radiation within the IR spectrum.  The most easily 
detectable targets are those considered “hot targets,” such 
as a combustion engine, exhaust, or other targets giving 
off substantial amounts of heat.  Landmines that store 
daytime heat from the sun are visible to the MWIR sensor as 
                     



































the surrounding air and ground cools faster than the mine.   
The MWIR sensor can also detect objects that are cooler in 
temperature than the surrounding area, in a practice known 
as “thermal inertia.”  While they do give off heat, human 
targets are more readily detected in the LWIR wavelengths.77 
The JMMES EOW sensor is a passive 12-band MSI 
sensor that detects the reflectance of ambient light from a 
target in the visible spectrum.  These MSI sensors are used 
to detect both land-based and maritime.  The EOW MSI sensor 
is able to penetrate seawater to detect submerged targets, 
as well as discern and separate sea clutter on the 
surface.78   
The JMMES EOM sensor is a passive four-band MSI 
sensor, operating in the VNIR spectrum and reliant on the 
detection of reflected ambient light from a target.  It is 
optimally used for the detection of landmines, ocean mines 
in water depths up to 40 feet.  The EOM sensor has a much 
smaller field of view than the EOW sensor, but since the 
four EOM bands are inclusive in the set of 12 bands from 
the EOW sensor, the EOM sensor can provide a zoom-like 
functionality across those four specific bands for objects 
detected in the EOW mode of operation.79   
The JMMES EON sensor is a passive, three-band, 
low-light, two-step camera.  It can be utilized as a 
conventional EO camera to detect both maritime surface and 
land based targets.  The EON sensor operates in two fields-
of-view, which provide a significant (50x) step-zoom 
                     




capability.  It can be utilized in its wide field-of-view as 
a wide-area-search scanning tool, and then utilized in the 
narrow field of view mode for further zoom and target 
identification.80 
While the tested JMMES configuration was not 
equipped with LD/LRF capability, it is worth noting the 
added value of these additions.  The LD/LRF is in a single 
package and provides an eye-safe ranging and targeting 
designation capability out to 30 kilometers.  In 
conjunction with the LD/LRF, JMMES also has a “See Spot” 
capability within the EON sensor, allowing the system to 
detect its own laser designation.  This affords the 
operator the opportunity to verify and validate the 
designated target, in both day and night time operations.81 
The collection of aforementioned sensors provides 
data to the onboard data processor.  The processor is the 
driving force of JMMES and allows real-time data input from 
all sensors for multi-sensor image acquisition, 
navigational data integration, real time tactical automatic 
detection and image processing, and a snapshot capture 
capability.  It contains the various detection algorithms 
and associated software packages/modules that allow the 
multi-mission functionality.  These specific modules and 
algorithms will be further discussed in ensuing sections. 
The operator can access the sensors and the 
processor through the graphical user interface (GUI), or 
the sensors only through a handheld turret control/display.  
The handheld turret controller provides a manual override 
                     
80 JMMES JCTD Concept of Employment, 1 December 2007. 
81 Ibid. 
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capability for the JMMES turret, which is controlled 
automatically through the GUI and processor during normal 
operations.  The GUI displays separate subdivided fields of 
view for the various sensors, providing access to both real 
time and processed data and images.82  The data is collected 
by one or multiple sensors and then sent to a common 
acquisition and control mechanism.  From there, depending 
on the system mission settings, the data is processed 
through one of the mission software modules.  After 
processing, the image and associated technical information 
is sent to the operator and accessed through the GUIA 
graphical depiction of data flow from the sensors, to the 
processors and through the specific mission software is 
included in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19.   JMMES System Data Flow83 
                     
82 JMMES JCTD Concept of Employment, 1 December 2007. 
83 Ibid. 
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D. JMMES SYSTEMS DESIGN OVERVIEW 
JMMES system development predominantly followed a top-
down systems engineering functionality, though it did 
follow good systems engineering principles by also 
incorporating an aspect of bottom-up design.  In top-down 
engineering, the system is developed to meet a predefined 
set of system requirements that flow in at the top level of 
design.  Bottom up engineering is also important, as it is 
used to answer questions on both technical feasibility and 
organizational capability.  However, too much bottom-up 
engineering leads to missed requirements and eventual 
integration problems.  When requirements flow from the top 
down, “the balancing force is feasibility, which flows back 
up to ensure that higher level design decisions don't 
result in downstream requirements which are excessively 
difficult or impossible to meet.”84 
Specifically, the requirements for JMMES were laid out 
in the JMMES CoE and summarized again in the JMMES JCTD 
Integrated Assessment Plan (IAP).  The IAP began by stating 
the broad, overarching problem: 
The United States, Interagency, and Coalition 
forces seek improved ISR capabilities to detect, 
classify, identify, and track high interest 
targets in a timely, effective, and economical 
manner. Today, each mission area is supported by 
a unique sensor suite, optimized for each 
particular aircraft platform, with its own 
training, CONOPS, TTP, and maintenance 
requirements. The results are insufficient assets 
to fulfill cross-functional ISR mission 
requirements, less than optimal capability to 
provide persistent surveillance of asymmetric 
                     
84 Great Engineering, “Top Down vs. Bottom Up Design,” 
www.greatengineering.net, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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threats required for adequate situational 
awareness, and an inability to effectively 
detect, identify, characterize, track, monitor, 
and interdict asymmetric targets.85 
Once the problem was identified, it was possible to 
establish the desired specific capabilities in a system to 
meet the challenges of the predetermined problem.  
Specifically for JMMES, the requirements were: 
 
 Acquire a single, multi-mission system to operate 
from a variety of air platforms, including fixed 
wing, rotary wing, and ultimately UASs, vertical 
takeoff and landing tactical UASs, and aerostats 
 Support multiple mission areas during any flight 
 Reduce costs by optimizing, reducing, and/or 
standardizing hardware, training, CONOPS, TTP, 
maintenance, and logistics requirements across 
mission areas 
 Improve effectiveness of searches by providing 
reliable automated target recognition and 
actionable target and location information 
 Process data fast enough to support tactical 
operations 
 Employ open architecture and support augmentation 
of JMMES JCTD existing missions and 
implementation of future algorithms.86 
 
These specific capability requirements provided the 
framework for the top-down systems engineering and 
development of the JMMES system.  In the final system 
design, the system designers and engineers developed a 
                     
85 JMMES JCTD Integrated Assessment Plan. 
86 Ibid. 
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system with the following advertised capabilities in 
response to the provided requirements: 
 
 Processing software configurable to multiple 
missions without software re-load 
 Optimized target detection algorithms for each 
mission area 
 On board processing for all missions 
 Capability to extract and relay multispectral 
data over existing, low-bandwidth links 
 Capable of being hosted by multiple platform 
types (military and civilian: fixed wing, rotary 
wing, and ultimately UAVs and aerostats) 
 Multiple looks at each observed pixel from a 
single pass by the aircraft 
 Automatic alerting on target detection to 
streamline human-in-the-loop analysis 
 High detection rate and low false alarm rate 
 Open architecture for spiral upgrade 
development.87 
 
E. JMMES UNIQUE TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
JMMES multi-mission functionality and the associated 
enabling mission-specific algorithms are fundamental 
underlying principles of the aforementioned system 
capabilities.  We will further examine these unique 
technologies individually in the following sections.   
1. Multi-mission Capability 
As previously discussed, JMMES has eight multi-mission 
application areas that are currently being tested in the 
JCTD process.  These areas include: ASW, SUW, MIO, SAR, 
                     
87 JMMES JCTD Integrated Assessment Plan. 
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MCM, CIED, CCCD, ICD.  We will examine JMMES theoretical 
functionality in ASW, SUW, MIO, and Maritime SAR (MSAR) 
modes of operation, as those were the areas tested during 
our field testing. 
In ASW mode, JMMES is designed to exploit both passive 
EO and magnetic detection of subsurface contacts in shallow 
water and littoral regions.  Four independent sensors are 
utilized in this prosecution, including the 12-band EOW 
during daylight, the bioluminescence sensor during 
nighttime, the MWIR sensor during both day and night 
operations, and the MAD sensor.  In SUW mode, surface 
contact detection is conducted utilizing three independent 
sensors.  JMMES utilizes the 12-band EOW sensor and the 
four-band EOM sensor during daylight operations, and the 
MWIR sensor during either day or nighttime operations.  In 
auto-detection mode, JMMES EO scans produce a contact list 
and associated EON high resolution with each contact.  
JMMES MIO mode of operation is a sub function of the SUW 
mode and utilizes the EOM and EON sensors to provide high-
resolution tracking and monitoring during surface vessel 
interdiction. In MSAR mode of operation, JMMES utilizes two 
sensors as it searches for wreckage, life rafts, personal 
flotation devices, and individuals in the water.  JMMES 
employs the 12-band EOW sensor and MWIR sensor in daylight 
and nighttime SAR operations respectively.88 
While different mission sets utilize the same sensors 
within the JMMES turret, each specific mode of operation 
utilizes a different processing algorithm to enable the 
systems auto-detection capability.  The multi-mission 
                     
88 JMMES JCTD Integrated Assessment Plan. 
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functionality of JMMES allows the system operator to switch 
between mission sets in a given flight.89  We will look more 
closely at the specific algorithms in the following 
section.   
2. Unique Algorithms 
JMMES employs multiple unique algorithms that enable 
both target detection and tracking.  While specific 
technical algorithm information is proprietary and thus 
unavailable, the JMMES Concept of Employment does provide 
an overview of the various algorithms. 
There are four detection algorithms discussed: anomaly 
detection, wavelet and glint, scene segmentation, and 
coherent change.  The anomaly detection algorithm is an 
advanced algorithm used to detect objects that do not 
belong with their surroundings.  This algorithm is useful 
for detecting contacts that stand out from the constant 
color of the ocean.  The scene segmentation algorithm is 
designed to improve and enhance the efficiency of wide area 
searches.  The wavelet and glint removal algorithm enhances 
detection capabilities by eliminating false contacts caused 
by sunlight glint off the water’s surface or by higher sea-
states.  The coherent change detection algorithm is 
utilized to detect changes to the operating environment 
between consecutive flights.90 
In addition to the detection algorithms, there are two 
additional algorithms utilized by the system: multi-
hypothesis tracking (MHT) and spectral-fingerprinting.  The 
                     
89 JMMES JCTD Concept of Employment, 1 December 2007. 
90 Ibid. 
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MHT algorithm allows the system to automatically track 
surface contacts without operator intervention to lock onto 
a target.  The MHT algorithm also allows the system to 
change the field of view in search of other targets, while 
maintaining the capability to regain track on a previously 
identified target after the search.  The spectral 
fingerprinting capability allows JMMES to identify 
previously detected surface contacts by their spectral 
image.  This capability is extremely useful in high-density 
contact areas such as the littoral regions.91 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Business organizations must continually examine 
themselves and their operating environment to maintain 
their capabilities.  Every organization has a unique set of 
capabilities that allow it to perform its mission.  The 
resources, processes, and values are the key factors that 
affect an organization’s capabilities.92 It is important 
that organizations be proactive when changes are occurring. 
The operating environment in which organizations exist 
can affect the available resources, business processes, and 
organizational culture.  The changes in the environment can 
the affect the quantity, quality, and type of resources 
available.  Variations in any aspect of resources directly 
impacts the amount of effort an organization must expend in 
either refining the resources into finished products, or 
incorporating it into processes of the organization.  The 
                     
91 JMMES JCTD Concept of Employment, December 2007. 
92 Clayton M. Christensen and Michael Overdorf, “Meeting the 
Challenge of Disruptive Change,” Harvard Business Review Edition 
(March-April, 2000), 68.  
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operating environment also impacts business process by 
defining the limits of acceptability and possibility.  For 
example the “sweat shops” of the 19th century became 
unacceptable after a change in the operating environment, 
forcing organizations that utilized this process to adapt. 
Organizational culture is impacted in the same manner as 
business processes, with workplace discrimination providing 
an example of a change mandated by new realities.  
Environmental changes can impact one or many areas and is 
often a catalyst for organizational change.  Christensen 
and Overdorf present a study that describes how applying 
innovation to resources, processes, and values, enable and 
organization to adapt to change.  With the appropriate 
analysis, and planning management can formulate appropriate 
combinations of innovation to maintain organizational 
capabilities. 
Many organizations exhibit superior management, but lack 
the habit of thinking about their organization’s capabilities 
as carefully as they think about the capabilities of their 
people.93 By understanding the capabilities of an 
organization, managers can leverage the capabilities to 
counter changes in the environment.  
Technological innovation is a common response to 
environmental change and can be separated into two 
categories: sustaining or disruptive.94  Each of these 
categories affects the organization in different manners. 
Sustaining innovations are technologies that make a product 
                     
93 Christensen and Overdorf, “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive 
Change,” 68. 
94 Ibid., 71-72. 
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or service perform in better ways, and most organizations 
are well suited to accept it.95  Organizations routinely 
encounter sustaining innovations and are normally well 
structured to foster its creation. Disruptive innovations 
are entirely new products or services and normally 
initially result in decreased performance.96  Disruptive 
innovation is comparatively more difficult for an 
organization to cope with and is not seen as frequently.  
Many organizations instinctively resist disruptive changes 
previously successful processes, but when the operating 
environment changes in a significant manner, adopting 
disruptive innovation may be the only answer. Operating 
environments never remain constant and organizations that 
accept this fact and prepare for change increase their 
chances of continued success.  In an effort to predict 
organizational disruptions such as backlogs, risks,  
or reduced——yet required——skill levels, organizational 
simulation software packages have been developed.  This 
next section discusses one such package entitled “POW-ER.”  
G. POW-ER MODELING SOFTWARE 
Modeling software provides managers with the 
capability to simulate changes in various facets of an 
organization to conduct cost/benefit analysis before 
implementation of innovations.  Prior to the development of 
modeling software, many organizations relied on the 
instincts of management to determine the best innovation to  
 
                     




adopt.  Utilizing modeling software affords organizations 
the opportunity for better and more consistent predictions 
are possible. 
The strength of modeling and simulation lies in 
complex mathematical equations that are populated by user-
defined input via a user-system interface.  The interface 
gathers assumptions, facts, figures, and other pertinent 
data about the system to be modeled.  The software converts 
the user’s inputs and specifications using appropriate 
equations and algorithms. 
The results of the simulation help the user to 
determine solutions that can be optimized for a desired 
parameter. The solutions provided by models are heavily 
influenced by the quality of the assumptions and rules 
established at the outset.  Users must keep in mind that 
computer simulations will produce a result even if the 
assumptions are erroneous. Accepting results from 
simulations with erroneous assumptions can result in wasted 
effort and meaningless results.  
Modeling software packages have been optimized for 
particular purposes and organization types. For example, 
software packages have been tailored to manufacturing, 
weather, financial services, communication, etc.  Selecting 
the appropriate type of modeling software is important 
because the underlying formulas are only valid for 
predetermined situations.  Using ill-suited modeling 
software may produce results that are of little or no 
value.   
POW-ER modeling software was developed at Stanford 
University by the Virtual Design Team (VDT).  It follows a 
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structured process for creating optimized project 
resources. The developers of VDT had observed that the 
process for managing resources from people to tasks lacked 
structure.  Their goal was to bring the discipline utilized 
by engineers to the process of managing project teams.  
VDT and POW-ER allow a user to create models that are 
capable of analyzing the flow of work and communications 
within organizations.  The models are comprised of elements 
that represent entities, work-tasks, milestone, and events. 
Any relationships between these elements are also captured 
in the model.  
POW-ER utilizes a graphical user interface (GUI) to 
build the models of organizational structures and 
workflows.  In the GUI, entities that perform work are 
called positions and are represented by a green human 
figure, tasks are represented by a yellow box, and 
milestones are represented by blue polygons.  The start and 
stop milestones have shapes that are unique and not used 
for any other user defined milestones. Figure 20 shows the 
basic layout for the POW-ER 3.8 GUI with examples of the 
various entity graphical representations. 
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Figure 20.   POW-ER Graphical User Interface 
 
To build the model, the user inputs details about 
tasks, positions, milestones, and events, along with 
additional variables such as skill level required, 
complexity rating, effort required, and uncertainty. By 
varying the mentioned inputs, alternate cases can be 
created for comparison. Figure 21 demonstrates how a 
completed model will appear after the inclusion of task, 




Figure 21.   Sample POW-ER model with multiple tasks 
 
POW-ER runs simulations of the modeled cases to 
produce statistical data for analysis of performance. The 
results of the simulations allow users to examine the 
interaction between organization structures and workflow to 
discover subtle relationships that affect performance. The 
data obtained from the simulation can be presented in table 
or graph format. Figure 22 shows a Gantt chart of workflow.  
 
 
Figure 22.   Sample Gantt chart 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. TRIDENT WARRIOR 2009 
1. Exercise Overview 
Trident Warrior is an annual FORCEnet sea trial 
exercise conducted on a rotating basis between the east and 
west coast.  Hosted by Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) 
since 2003, the common aim of the exercise is to enhance 
the warfighter’s capabilities, specifically in the areas of 
new technology development, communication, and situational 
awareness.  During the exercise, U.S. naval forces team 
with other DoD services, international partners, civilian 
agencies, and defense industry organizations to test new 
technologies.  Trident Warrior 2009 (TW09) took place in 
June 2009 and was a test-bed for 115 technologies across 10 
focus areas: networks, coalition interaction, information 
operations, command and control operations, ISR, electronic 
warfare, distance support, information assurance, cross-
domain solutions, and maritime domain awareness.97 
2. Planned Flight Operations 
 TW09 was the first of three scheduled operational 
demonstrations during the JMMES JCTD process.  
Specifically, TW09 was used to assess JMMES ASW, SUW, MIO, 
and MSAR capabilities.  The JMMES TW09 Demonstration 
Execution Document (DED) outlined the aim of the TW09 JMMES 
demonstration as: 
                     
97 Second Fleet Public Affairs Press Release, “Trident Warfighter 
Includes International Partners, Increases Warfighting Capability,” 
Navy Newsstand, 13 December 2008. 
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to evaluate single mission flights, dual/multi-
mission flights, in-flight detection and 
identification, and post-flight detection and 
identification using archived data.  Each flight 
will have pre-determined assessment objectives, 
metrics to be evaluated, and situations to be 
executed to produce the required data.  
Demonstration execution is defined by the JMMES 
flight plan, target configurations, and data 
collection plan.98  
The DED also included specific guidelines and focuses 
for each of the four tested mission areas.  For ASW 
operations, the exercise provided opportunity for day and 
nighttime missions, with an increasing level of difficulty 
as the missions progressed throughout the exercise.  For 
SUW and MIO operations, the focus was diverse, including 
both fast attack craft operating in a swarm type scenario, 
as well as traditional large surface craft operating 
independently in both day and nighttime scenarios.  Lastly, 
TW09 provided the opportunity to test day and nighttime 
MSAR operations in a variety of scenarios: simulated downed 
aircrews in friendly and hostile environments, man 
overboard scenarios, and civilian vessel SAR.   
In attempts to make the exercise flights as realistic 
as possible, the search capability of JMMES would be de-
emphasized in some scenarios.  Specifically, an EO/IR 
turret would not be a primary wide-area search tool in 
real-world, open-water ASW operations.  Rather, the EO/IR 
asset would be cued and guided by RADAR and/or SONAR 
systems to a last known position of a subsurface contact 
before attempting to detect and track a contact.  Thus, in 
TW09, cueing data was provided for last known positions of 
                     
98 JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document (DED), 6 June 2009. 
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identified subsurface contacts in attempts to create an 
accurate scenario.99  This time-latent contact reduced the 
search area and provided a starting point for pre-
determined search patterns. 
There were 13 JMMES test flights scheduled during 
TW09, with an additional two days of as-needed make-up 
flights.  All flights were conducted onboard either a JMMES 
equipped King Air fixed-wing aircraft or Bell 407 
helicopter.  Table 2 displays the preliminary schedule of 
flights for TW09 and Figures 23 and 24 show a King Air and 
Bell 407 respectively.  
 
  




                     










Figure 24.   Bell 407 Helicopter102 
The flight crew onboard the King Air and Bell 407 was 
comprised of five personnel: aircraft pilot, first 
officer/co-pilot, JMMES operator, mission area subject 
matter expert (SME), and Operational Test Agent (OTA) 
observer.  We, the authors of this thesis, filled the role  
 
 
                     
101 JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document (DED), 6 June 2009. 
102 Image obtained from BAE Systems JMMES Preliminary Results 
Presentation. 
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of OTA observer, along with Mr. Brian Wood, of the NPS 
Distributed Information and Systems Experimentation (DISE) 
research group.   
The aircraft pilot and first officer were contracted 
with the aircraft and their primary responsibilities were 
the execution of the predetermined flight plan, 
coordination of in-flight modifications to the 
predetermined flight plan, and ensuring safety-of-flight of 
the aircraft.   
The JMMES operators were JMMES system experts from BAE 
Systems.  Their primary responsibility was the physical 
operation of JMMES, to include pre-flight, in-flight, and 
post-flight operations, in-flight system troubleshooting, 
interpreting JMMES target detections, and providing 
expertise on system capabilities. 
The mission area SME varied depending on the mission 
profile of the flight, as there were designated SMEs for 
ASW, SUW, MIO, and MSAR mission areas.  The SMEs were 
active duty naval aviators with extensive experience 
operating comparable sensors and monitoring the associated 
sensor displays while conducting real-world operations in 
the various TW09 mission areas.   Their primary 
responsibilities included ensuring the operational realism 
of the flights and providing subjective assessment of the 
system.  Specifically, the SMEs responsibilities were to 
consult in the mission flight plan development, validate 
mission tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), observe 
in-flight system operations, and direct in-flight data 
capture.  As the JMMES operators did not have an 
operational background in the specific mission areas, and 
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as it was not feasible to provide the mission area SMEs 
adequate training to become system experts on JMMES, the 
combination of the mission area SME and JMMES operator 
simulated the equivalent of a mission and system expert 
operating JMMES onboard the aircraft in a real-world 
environment.   
The final flight crewmember was the OTA observer, who 
was responsible for the execution of the data capture 
portions of the flights.  Specifically, the OTA observer’s 
responsibilities included aiding in the development of an 
appropriate mission plan, providing airborne modification 
of said mission plan as needed,  maintaining a detailed 
flight log of all operational and administrative matters of 
the flight, and ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the 
exercise flights on behalf of the JCTD evaluation team.103 
Figures 25 and 26 show the flight crew seating 
positions onboard the King Air and Bell 407, respectively.   
 
 
Figure 25.   King Air Flight Crew Positions104 
                     
103 Image obtained from JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document 
(DED), 6 June 2009. 
104 Ibid. 
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Figure 26.   Bell 407 Flight Team Positions105 
 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Evaluation Criteria and Methodology 
The TW09 JMMES evaluation methodology consisted of 
both in-flight and post-flight qualitative and quantitative 
data collection.  In-flight qualitative data collection 
consisted of the OTA observer monitoring the operations of 
and providing survey questions to the JMMES system operator 
and the mission area SME.  In-flight quantitative data 
collection consisted of event and system logs maintained by 
the JMMES system operator, mission area SME, and the OTA 
observer. 
                     
105 Image obtained from JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document 
(DED), 6 June 2009. 
1- Pilot 
2- First Officer 
3- SME
4- OTA Observer
5- JMMES  
  Operator 
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Post-flight operations consisted of data-processing, 
data-archiving, and post-mission surveys, delving into both 
the qualitative and quantitative realm.  Post-flight data 
processing and data archiving allowed the JMMES operator 
and mission analyst to re-process and review collected 
system data for possible missed information and provide 
inputs to improve future mission sets.  Post-flight surveys 
were distributed to both the JMMES operator and mission 
area SME and included both qualitative and quantitative 
aspects.106  For the scope of this thesis and the POW-ER 
model presented in Chapter IV, we are focusing on the 
quantitative data gleaned from the exercise. 
The surveys and flight evaluations were focused on 
gathering information to evaluate the three JCTD defined 
Critical Operational Issues (COI) across the exercise 
mission areas.  These COIs included Operational Impact, 
Functionality, and Suitability.  Table 3 contains a 
snapshot of the specific components of COI-1 (Operational 
Impact), as well as the associated survey questions used to 
evaluate the COI.  Specifically, it presents the primary 
COI-1 question (labeled 1.1), with qualitative and 
quantitative sub-questions also listed.  To the right of 
each question are the associated survey line items that 
cover the COI primary question and sub-questions.  A 
complete version of the COI-1, COI-2, and COI-3 JCTD MUA 
assessments can be found in Appendix A. 
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   SA3  Rate the ease of maintaining SA across the AOR during search.   SA2   
                     Quantitative   
   SA4  Number, fraction, of detected targets for which SA can be maintained during search.    
   Level of Reconnaissance   
                   Qualitative   
   LR1  Does JMMES improve the level of reconnaissance in the assigned surveillance area?  ISR2 
       
Table 3.   Snapshot of COI-1 Assessment107 
 
In addition to the JMMES JCTD MUA COIs, the in-flight 
and post-flight evaluation included seven additional Areas 
of Interest (AoI).  These AoIs were developed by members of 
the NPS DISE research group to compliment the defined COIs 
and ensure robust analysis of JMMES capabilities.  The AoIs 
are Mission Area Support (MA), ISR Operations Support 
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(CISR), Target Situation Awareness (TS), Operator Workload 
(W), In-flight System Management (SM), Human System 
Interaction (HS), and Automated Features (AF).108  These 
AoIs were found in both the survey itself and in the post-
exercise analysis of the surveys. 
The TW09 JMMES surveys were developed in response to 
the defined COIs and AoIs by Dr. Nelson Irvine, of the NPS 
DISE research group.  Table 4 provides a snapshot of the 
survey used in TW09 and includes the questions presented to 
both the JMMES operator and mission area SME.  The far 
right hand column on the survey shows which specific 
questions were included in the surveys provided to each 
individual.  For instance, the first question, MA1, is 
highlighted in the SME column, indicating it is included 
only on the SME post-mission survey.  Working right-to-left 
across the columns, the next column provides the 
correlation between the questions in the survey and the 
associated COI sub-question.  The next columns to the left 
provide the basis for quantitative inputs from the SME and 
JMMES operator.  Further qualitative inputs and subjective 
comments were requested and both the SME and JMMES operator 
provided detailed opinions in conjunction with the 
quantitative numerical rankings.  A full copy of the survey 
can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 4.   Portion of TW09 JMMES Master Survey109 
 
2. TW09 Flight Operations 
We conducted 13 JMMES test flights during exercise 
TW09, testing the system’s ASW, SUW, MIO, and MSAR 
capabilities.  Though originally scheduled mission times 
were modified due to inclement weather, target platform 
availability, and system maintenance issues, both daytime 
and nighttime flights were completed across the four 
mission areas.  For clarity purposes and due to their 
similar nature within TW09, SUW and MIO are combined in 
post-exercise analysis. 
The primary ASW mission target was the USS ALEXANDRIA 
(SSN 757), while the primary SUW mission targets included 
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USS BULKELEY (DDG 84), USS FARRAGUT (DDG 37), and USS 
NASSAU (LHA 4), as well as various commercial and private 
vessels used as targets of opportunity.  For the MSAR 
missions, targets included a simulated man overboard in the 
water, simulated downed pilot, and a manned life raft.  In 
the scenarios, a dummy (Oscar) simulated the MSAR victim.   
A U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Auxiliary craft was used to 
coordinate MSAR exercise operations.   Figure 27 shows U.S. 
Navy vessels that participated as targets for JMMES testing 
and Figure 28 shows an example of a USCG Auxiliary craft.  
 
 
Figure 27.   U.S. Navy Vessels in TW09 JMMES Flights110 
                     
110 Figure obtained from pre-mission briefings presented to flight 




Figure 28.   USCG Auxiliary Craft111 
 
All TW09 JMMES flights took place on the Virginia 
Capes (VACAPES) operating area (OPAREA), with mission 
launch and recovery at Oceana Naval Air Station and 
overwater operations in W-72B/C, W-50/R-6606, and the 
Hampton Roads departure corridor.  Figure 29 shows OPAREA 
W-72 used during TW09 JMMES flight operations.  Further 
charts of the exercise OPAREAs can be found in the JMMES 
JCTD DED. 
 
                     
111 Defense Industry Daily.com, “U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary,” 
www.defenseindustrydaily.com, accessed 15 September 2009. 
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Figure 29.   TW09 JMMES W-72 OPAREA112 
 
3. TW09 Post-flight Survey Analysis 
Post-mission surveys were completed by the mission 
area SME and JMMES operator for each of the 13 TW09 
exercise flights.  The mission area SME quantitative survey 
results are of primary interest to this thesis, as they 
provide an unbiased opinion as to JMMES functionality in 
the specific mission area tested and were used to 
accurately populate the POW-ER model in Chapter IV.  
NPS DISE research group member, Dr. Gordon Schacher, 
developed the methodology for quantitative analysis of the 
collected survey information.  Using the numerical ratings 
                     
112 Figure obtained from JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document 






provided in the mission area SME surveys, he developed a 
percentage rating for each specific question, and then for 
the individual mission areas, AoIs, and COIs.  Dr. Schacher 
then developed these percentages into histograms to examine 
the various AOIs and COIs in greater detail.  The final 
numerical scores are not individually statistically 
significant, but rather are a visual and numerical means to 
understand the mission area SME evaluation of military 
utility of the JMMES system.113  In other words, by itself, 
a score of 60% is arbitrary, but is useful in comparison 
across the mission areas, COIs, and AoIs.  
We will first look at the specific COI questions that 
were provided in the surveys for the specific mission 
areas, and then we will look further at the specific 
mission area by breaking them down through their associated 
AoIs.  
a. COI Ratings 
Table 5 presents three histograms displaying the 
frequency of assigned numerical grades given to the various 
COIs across the mission areas by the mission area SMEs.  
The SMEs provided numerical scores of “0, 1, 2, 3, 4” in 
response to the COI questions in the post-mission surveys, 
with a score of zero equating to poor and a score of four 
equating to superior for the specific question asked.   
Using Dr. Schacher’s incrementally weighted scale 
and allotting “0, 25, 50, 75, and 100” points for scores of 
“0, 1, 2, 3, and 4,” respectively, a percentage was 
                     
113 Figure obtained from JMMES JCTD Demonstration Execution Document 
(DED), 6 June 2009.  
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calculated to provide a rough overall COI score for each 
mission category. In the case of SAR, 43% of the COI 
questions received a numerical grade of “1 of 4,” 29% of 
the COI questions received a numerical grade of “2 of 4,” 
and 29% received “3 of 4.”  These scores equated to a final 
SAR COI score of 46%.  A summary of all three COI scores is 
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Table 5.   Frequency of SME COI Grade Assignments114 
                     
114 Gordon Schacher, JMMES JCTD Maritime Utility Assessment DISE 







Table 6.   SME COI Grade/Rating Summary115 
 
b. AoI Ratings 
Dr. Schacher utilized the same incrementally 
weighted numerical scale to develop ratings/grades for the 
AoIs for each specific mission area.  The summary table of 
the AoIs and the associated grades for the various mission 
areas are included in Table 7.  The table shows a score of 
almost 50% across all evaluated mission areas and AoIs.  
These scores were used to populate the POW-ER simulation 
model presented in Chapter IV of this thesis.  Frequency 
histograms and further details on the data in Table 7 can 







                     
115 Gordon Schacher, JMMES JCTD Maritime Utility Assessment DISE 








                AoI  ASW/MIO SUW MSAR  Avg 
Mission‐Area Support  43%  35%  50%  43% 
ISR Ops Support  44%  36%  59%  46% 
Target Situational Awareness  25%  55%  44%  41% 
ISR Collection Activities  41%  33%  57%  44% 
Operator Workload  52%  33%  42%  42% 
In‐Flight System Management  55%  66%  60%  60% 
Human‐System Integration  60%  61%  59%  60% 
Automated Features  58%  30%  75%  54% 
 Totals  44%  47%  56%  49% 
 
Table 7.   SME AoI Grade/Rating Summary116 
                     
116 Gordon Schacher, JMMES JCTD Maritime Utility Assessment DISE 
Input, Appendix A. 
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IV. MARITIME ISR MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The DoD has expressed interest in enhancing their ISR 
capabilities across all services.  BAE Systems has offered 
JMMES as answer to this call, with claims of improved 
capability for maritime ISR.  JMMES is currently in the 
JCTD process and the results of the JMMES JCTD MUA will not 
be published until after the completion of this thesis.  
However, the data from TW09 is sufficient to construct a 
valid model of EO/IR search for ASW, SUW, and MSAR missions 
and this Answering “how will the addition of JMMES to 
manned Aircraft Systems impact the performance of current 
maritime ISR process?” 
This chapter will present an application of the VDT 
modeling process for EO/IR search in ASW, SUW, and SAR 
missions.  SME survey results and data from Chapter III is 
used to construct and validate the model.  The research 
conducted in Chapter IV builds on work with VDT performed 
by Carroll and Sundland (2009), in their thesis 
“Transforming Data and Metadata into Actionable 
Intelligence and Information within the Maritime Domain,” 
where they utilized POW-ER modeling software to examine 
extended maritime interdiction operations. Their work 
demonstrated the ability of POW-ER software to model 
processes of military missions. 
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B. VDT STEPS ONE THROUGH FOUR 
1. Baseline Definition: Workflow and Organization 
Model 
Step one of the VDT modeling process is to define the 
baseline for the workflow and organization models.  Three 
activities are required to complete step 1: 
 
1. Define the organization model 
2. Define the workflow model 
3. Define the links. 
 
When modeling a complex system, it is useful to scale 
the model to examine only the pertinent aspects of the 
system. For the purposes of this thesis, only the 
interaction between EO/IR sensor and the operator is of 
interest.  In order to scale down the MISR process, all 
tasks unrelated to the EO/IR sensor and operator 
interaction were eliminated. 
Another useful technique when modeling complex systems 
is to include only those items that will create change as 
alternate cases are compared.  Items that are not impacted 
by changes in cases are constants, and eliminating these 
constants has no impact on output.  It is important to 
ensure that the constants to be eliminated are not vital to 
any combined statistics that are sought. 
After scaling the MISR process and eliminating the 
unneeded constants, we created the resultant “non-JMMES 
workflow” or baseline case.  This baseline was validated by 
the Operational Test Agent (OTA) for JMMES JCTD at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
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a. Define Organization Model 
The first activity in step one of the VDT process 
is to create the organization model that will accomplish 
the baseline tasks. All positions that perform tasks are 
identified.  The derived baseline model is provided in 
Figure 30 and each specific position in the organization 
model is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 30.   Baseline Positions 
 
The Sensor Operator position is a member of the 
helicopter aircrew responsible for monitoring EO/IR sensor 
systems and analyzing information presented on video 
monitors in H-60 aircraft.  The Sensor Operator controls 
the EO/IR sensor with a WESCAM controller and must visually 
identify targets on the video display in the aircraft.  
During test flights, the EO/IR Sensor position 
was filled by the MX-15D turret.  Survey data shows the 
performance of MX-15D in MWIR is comparable to the AAS-44 
FLIR, which is currently utilized.  When deriving the model 
for POW-ER, positions are not exclusively assigned to 
humans. In order to understand the functioning of the 
system, any entity that performs a task must be modeled. 




interest and its performance characteristics will be 
compared to the MX-15D sensors combined EOW, EON, and MWIR 
utilized by JMMES. 
Each position has a number of parameters that 
need to be assigned values in order to accurately represent 
how well the position performs tasks. The values assigned 
to the property panel parameter determine probabilities of 
errors occurring in the performance of tasks. Figure 31 
shows the property panel for the EO/IR Sensor position. 
Details for the parameters entered for each "Position,” in 
the baseline case, are listed in Appendix D. 
 
 
Figure 31.   EO/IR Sensor Property Panel 
 
b. Define Workflow Model 
The next activity that must be accomplished in 
step one is to define the workflow model. In order to 
accurately define the baseline case, “non-JMMES workflow,” 
the MISR work process diagram was examined and tasks not 
impacted by JMMES were eliminated.  Six tasks were found to 
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be relevant for modeling and are listed in Table 8, along 
with the position that performs the tasks.  While the list 
appears short, the impact of the tasks on the much larger 
MISR process is significant.  
  Baseline search task List 
      
Task  Position 
      
Position EO/IR FOV   
EO/IR 
sensor 
Scan the IO/IR FOV   
EO/IR 
Sensor 
Locate anomalies in the FOV   
Sensor 
Operator 
Compare anomaly to known 
targets   
Sensor 
Operator 
Report target   
Sensor 
Operator 
Table 8.   Task List for Baseline Case 
 
Each task has associated properties that must be 
defined in the model. Figure 32 shows the property panel 
for the task "Scan the EO/IR FOV" to provide an example of 
parameters that must be defined. During simulation of the 
model, the properties for each task and position are 
utilized to calculate process performance. Appendix D 
contains a list of all task and the parameters. 
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Figure 32.   Scan the EO/IR FOV Properties Panel  
 
c. Define Links 
The final activity in step one is to define the 
links between the elements of the model. There are four 
types of links utilized: communication, task assignment, 
successor, and rework. Links provide details about how 
positions and/or tasks interact, and must be identified in 
order to run a simulation. 
There are two communication links in the workflow 
model.  The first is between the "Locate the anomalies in 
the FOV" and the "Scan the EO/IR FOV" tasks, this link 
allows the sensor pod to present an image to the sensor 
operator for visual examination.  The second communication 
link is between the "Compare anomaly to known target" and 
the "Scan the EO/IR FOV" tasks and allows the sensor 
operator to more closely examine the image in order to 
correctly identify the target.  
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The baseline case contains five task assignment 
links, shown as blue arcs in Figure 33.  Table 8 shows list 
of tasks and positions responsible for performing the 
tasks. 
The successor links describe the order in which 
tasks are executed.  After a task is completed, control is 
passed to its identified successor and a task may have more 
than one successor.  The start milestone has successor 
links to both “Position EO/IR FOV” and “Scan the EO/IR 
FOV,” both of which may begin concurrently after start.  
Rework links are included in the model to allow 
for capturing errors in tasks.  When an error occurs in a 
task that has a rework link, the task linked to will be re-
executed along with the current task.  For example, during 
execution of the "Compare anomaly to known targets" task, 
if the anomaly is not confirmed as a target, the operator 
should recommence the search by moving EO/IR to another 
area to search.  This is modeled by a rework link to the 
"Position EO/IR FOV" task. The rework task allows for some 
recursion in the model offering an improvement in the 
approximation of search process. 
2. Simulate Process to Assess Risks in Baseline Case 
Step two in VDT is to simulate the baseline process 
and assess results. POW-ER utilizes the information 
provided in step one to run a simulation and identify 
workflow backlogs, critical paths, rework times and 
simulation times.  The scenario that is modeled is a single 
H-60 equipped with EO/IR sensor searching for a target of 
interest.  
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POW-ER was designed to simulate processes that perform 
defined tasks a single time while moving toward a final 
milestone. By contrast, the process of searching for a 
target requires that tasks be repeated in a loop, until the 
target is found.  The baseline model is shown in Figure 33. 
 
 
Figure 33.   Baseline POW-ER Model 
During the simulation, POW-ER captures performance 
statistics and presents them to the user in chart or table 
form.  The model is run 100 times in order to identify the 
mean for all parameters of interest.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, parameters of interest include total time 
required for the process and critical path diagram. The 
average times required for execution of each task is shown 









  Baseline case time for task 
     
Task Time 
Position EO/IR FOV 0.0146 




     
  Total Time  1.4512 
Table 9.    Baseline tasks time required 
 
The Gantt chart provides a means to identify tasks 
that are critical to the performance of the system being 
modeled.   A task is identified as critical if delays in 
performance of the task will negatively impact the system.  
Conversely, non-critical tasks can be delayed with no 
impact to the system.  The amount of delay that a non-
critical task can accept is called float time.  Critical 
tasks are color coded red, non-critical tasks are blue, and 
float time is gray. The start and stop milestones are 
depicted as diamond shapes, all other tasks appear as bars 
with length proportional to the average time required to 
execute the task.  As can be seen in Figure 34, all tasks 
in the baseline case are critical to the performance of the 




Figure 34.    Gantt chart for baseline 
 
3. Simulate Alternatives 
Step three in the VDT process is similar to Steps one 
and two and can be broken down into four activities: 
 
1. Define changes to the baseline organization 
2. Define changes to baseline workflow 
3. Define changes to the baseline links 
4. Simulate process and assess the risks.  
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a. Define Changes to Baseline Organization 
The first activity to be completed is defining 
the changes to the baseline organization. All positions 
from the baseline case remain necessary and one additional 
position for JMMES is created for the alternative case. 
JMMES will perform tasks so must be represented as a 
position.  The skills and properties of JMMES are listed in 
Appendix E. A depiction of the new organization structure 
is shown in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35.   Alternate Case Organizational Structure 
 
b. Define Changes to Baseline Workflow 
The next activity required is to define the 
changes to the baseline workflow.  Changes to the workflow 
must be validated to ensure the simulation data is 
realistic.  With the introduction of JMMES, it was 
determined that all existing tasks remained relevant and 
two additional tasks were required.  Table 10 shows a list 











Table 10.   Alternative Task List 
 
The first new task is "Display target." One of 
the JMMES system’s innovative features is its ability to 
auto-detect anomalies in the FOV and classify them.  Once 
JMMES has detected an anomaly, it compares the EO and IR 
signature to a pre-loaded database of known targets.  If a 
match is found, JMMES highlights the target location and 
provides a short description on the system display. For 
anomalies that cannot be matched to a signature in the 
database, JMMES highlights the target location and provides 
an "unknown" description on the system display. 
The second new task added is "Verify target." Due 
to variations in atmospheric conditions, illumination, and 
viewing angle, the spectral fingerprint of targets can be 
slightly different from database entries and result in an 
"Unknown" classification.  The number of possible spectral 
fingerprints for a single target can become quite large and 
with multiple targets the database size becomes 
problematic.  Prior to mission launch, JMMES is loaded with 
designated necessary spectral fingerprints.  Due to this  
 
 JMMES EO/IR Area Search Task List 
      
Task  Position 
Position EO/IR FOV   JMMES 
Scan the IO/IR FOV   
EO/IR 
sensor 
Locate anomalies in the FOV   JMMES 
Compare anomaly to known 
targets   JMMES 
Display target to operator   JMMES 
Verify target   Operator 
Report target   Operator 
 105
limitation, JMMES reliability in correctly auto-detecting 
targets is currently less than a human operator, therefore 
a verification task is necessary. 
c. Define Changes to Links 
The next activity to be completed is “define 
changes to links.” As with the baseline case there are 
communications, task assignment, successor, and rework 
links.  An additional communication link is added to those 
defined in the baseline case to create alternative case. As 
previously discussed, the need to verify JMMES 
classification of anomaly dictates that the "Verify target" 
task communicate with the system operator. 
There is one extra rework link required to define 
the alternative case. The additional link is from the 
"Verify target" task to the "Position EO/IR FOV" task. 
During the "Verify target" task, the possibility exists 
that JMMES target notification is a false alarm.  In the 
case that a target is falsely called, the process should 
recommence the search.  
d. Run Simulation of the Alternative Case 
The alternative case model is shown in Figure 36. 
The data captured after the simulation of the alternative 








Table 11.   Alternative case task time required 
 
4. Refine Model to Capture Lessons-Learned 
The final step in the VDT process is to capture the 
lessons learned.  A comparison of total time required to 
perform all task shows a reduction from 1.451 to 1.429. 
This translates to a 2% reduction in total time required, 
Alternative case time for task 
 
      
Task  Time 
Position EO/IR FOV  0.0058 
Scan the EO/IR Field of View  0.0029 
Locate Anomalies in FOV  0.0029 
Compare anomaly to known targets  1.4000 
Display TGT info  0.0029 
Verify target  0.0058 
Report target  0.0088 
      
     Total Time   1.4292 
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despite the addition of two additional tasks. Table 12 
shows side-by-side comparison of time for baseline and 
alternative cases. 
 
Task Time Time Position 
        
Position EO/IR FOV 0.0146 0.0058 
EO/IR 
sensor 
Scan the EO/IR Field of View 0.0058 0.0029 JMMES 
Locate Anomalies in FOV 0.0088 0.0029 
JMMES / 
Operator 
Compare anomaly to known targets 1.4000 1.4000 JMMES 
Display TGT info N/A 0.0029 JMMES 
Verify target N/A 0.0058 JMMES 
Report target 0.0220 0.0088 Operator 
       
  Total  1.4512 1.4292  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
There were 13 JMMES system test-flights conducted 
during exercise Trident Warrior 2009, evaluating system 
capability in ASW, SUW, MIO, and SAR operations.  Post-
mission surveys were completed by the mission-area SMEs, 
allowing them to provide both a “score” of mission 
performance in a variety of predefined test-areas, as well 
as associated qualitative feedback on system performance.  
While the final individual numerical scores were not, by 
themselves, statistically significant, they allow for 
comparison between the different tested mission areas. 
The results of survey information showed that in the 
tested COI areas, JMMES performed significantly better in 
MSAR operations as compared to SUW and ASW operations.  
When considering the more-detailed AOI areas, JMMES scored 
49%, or average on the “0 to 4” scale utilized by the 
mission area SMEs.  This indicates that in the opinion of 
the designated experts, JMMES performs at an adequate or 
average level as compared to currently employed systems.   
The modeling provided in Chapter IV demonstrated that 
JMMES equipped manned aircraft system required less time in 
workflow and organization communication than non-JMMES 
manned aircraft system. The reduction in time required 
stemmed primarily from JMMES ability to store and replay 
captured imagery.  For the non-JMMES model the operator 
consumed time zooming in on anomaly of interest or re-
acquiring if the anomaly were no longer in the field of 
view.   
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Although the JMMES model showed reduction in time 
required, the reduction is minimal.  While the model 
simulated only one iteration of a multi-step search 
process, the small percentage of time saved remains around 
2% regardless of the number of iterations required.  
Although seemingly insignificant in difference, this time 
decrease can be multiplied over several aircraft.  Mission 
flexibility is also greatly enhanced as neither the 
aircraft nor the equipment would require exchanging.  
B. PROBLEMS 
JMMES demonstrates technology that can be viewed as 
“disruptive” by the definition provided in Christensen and 
Overdorf study, “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive 
Change.”  Because of this fact, JMMES cannot be expected to 
perform well in a system for which it was not designed.  
The mission flights in TW09 were designed to assess 
military utility and not fully examine the potential 
capabilities. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While researching this thesis, we identified several 
item of future research for students who wish to develop 
them further.  The items are listed. 
1. Study the performance of JMMES’ additional system 
capability areas, specifically Counter Camouflage and 
Concealment, Illicit Crop Detection, Counter Improvised 
Explosive Device, Mine Counter Measures, and Combat Search 
and Rescue. 
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2. Analyze currently employed air search patterns to 
develop new search patterns that are optimized for JMMES 
detection capabilities across all mission areas. 
3. Develop a simulation model to determine the 
optimal force composition of manned and unmanned systems on 
a surface combatant operating in the littoral regions. 
4. Examine the performance of the multi-spectral 
electro-optic sensors in low-light conditions. 
5. Conduct side-by-side field capability tests of 
JMMES and currently employed EO/IR systems to obtain 





















APPENDIX A.  COI JMMES JCTD MUA ASSESSMENTS 
A. COI-1 JMMES JCTD MUA ASSESSMENTS 









   SA1  Does  JMMES  improve  awareness  of  the  target  situation  in  the  assigned 
surveillance area?   





   SA3  Rate the ease of maintaining SA across the AOR during search.   SA2   




                   Qualitative   
   LR1  Does  JMMES  improve  the  level  of  reconnaissance  in  the  assigned 
surveillance area?  ISR2 
1.2     Does  JMMES  detect,  classify,  identify,  and  track  camouflaged,  and  concealed 
objects fast enough to support tactical operations?  C1.2 
   Concealed and Camouflaged Objects   
                    Qualitative   
   CC1  Are the speeds of detection and identification of objects of interest sufficient 
for tactical operations?    ISR7 
   CC2  Can objects of interest be tracked during search?   ISR7 
                     Quantitative   








                     Qualitative   
   L1  Does automated detection improve the probability of detection?  AF2 
   L2  Does  automated  detection  improve  the  ability/speed  of  the  operator  for 
identification?  AF5 
   L3  Does automated cueing produce excessive false alarms?   AF4 
   Workload   
                       Qualitative   
   W2  Does system automated detection reduce workload?  W2, 
AF3 




B. COI-2 JMMES JCTD MUA ASSESSMENTS 
 




     Qualitative  C2.1 
   SC1  Is the ability to prosecute more than one mission area from a single flight 
a significant advantage to ISR operations?   ISR6 






   SC4  Do post‐flight processing capabilities enhance JMMES mission support?     PF2,3 
   SC5  Does  JMMES  provide  ISR  capabilities  that  are  not  available  from  other 
assets (list)?   ISR3 
     Quantitative   
   SC6  Determine the probability of detection for known targets.   
   SC7  Determine detection false alarm rate.    
   SC8  Determine the time between search initiation and initial detection of each 
target.    




     Qualitative   
   IQ1  Does the GUI provide usable, clear, accurate, relevant views?   HS4 
   IQ2  Are high‐power zoom images usable, clear?   AF1 
   IQ3 
For each advanced  image processing  capability  that  is available  rate  the 





     Qualitative  C2.2 
   SE1 
Rate  JMMES  effectiveness  supporting:    Collection  Planning,  Collection 
Tasking,  Search,  Detect,  Identify,  and  Track.   




   SE2  Can stationary/moving objects be tracked?  TT1 
   SE3  Is operator executed tracking persistent, accurate?   TT2 
   SE4  Is automated system tracking persistent, accurate?   TT3 
   SE5  Does JMMES provide improved Detection, Identification?  Coll1 
   SE6  Rate JMMES accuracy supporting Detect, Identify?  Coll4 
   SE7  Rate JMMES speed supporting Detect, Identify?  Coll3 




   SE9  Determine for each target the times between detection and identification.    
   SE10  Determine the location error for each target.    
2.3   Does JMMES architecture interface with current and future fielded equipment?      
      No determination will be made.    
2.4      Is JMMES  interoperable with existing sensor systems as related to  intelligence 
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED)?   
   ISR Interoperability   
     Qualitative  C2.4 
   In1  Rate  the  ease of  integrating  JMMES with other  ISR  assets  for  collection 
tasking.   ISR4 
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C. COI-3 JMMES JCTD MUA ASSESSMENTS 
      COI‐3 JMMES JCTD MUA Assessments  Survey 
3.1      Is  the  JMMES capability operationally  suitable  for  the eight user‐prioritized 
mission areas?  C3.1 
   Mission Suitability   
               Qualitative   
   MS1  Rate JMMES suitability for supporting this ISR mission.    MA1,2,4
   MS2  Determine any mission  required  functions  that  cannot be provided by 
the system.  MA4 
   MS3  Rate the reliability of the system.  SM6 
               Quantitative   
   MS4  Determine the fraction of flight time for which the system is down.    
   MS5  Log system performance for duration of the mission.     
3.2   Is JMMES reliable, trainable, supportable, and maintainable?  C3.2 
   System Management   
               Qualitative   
   SM1  Rate system management efficiency.  SM1 
   SM2  Rate sensor management efficiency.  SM2 
   SM3  Rate system status reports effectiveness (accuracy, clarity, sufficiency).   SM4 
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   SM4  Rate search coverage map effectiveness (accuracy, clarity, sufficiency).  SM5 
   SM5  Rate system configuration ease/efficiency: pre‐flight,  in‐flight, recovery 
after failure.   SM3 
   SM6  Rate sensor tasking/re‐tasking ease/efficiency.   SM3 
   SM7  Rate  the ease/efficiency of  in‐flight  re‐configuration  for a new mission 
area.   W5 
                    Quantitative   
   SM8  Fraction of flight time spent in system management.    
   Human System Interaction   
                     Qualitative   
   HS1  List JMMES training received prior to the test.    




   HS4  Rate the GUI for activity support effectiveness.  HS4, 
W6 
   HS5  Rate how easy JMMES is to use.   HS2 
   HS6  Was disorientation or concentration fatigue a factor in JMMES usage?  If 
so, explain cause.   HS3 








with  respect  to  aircraft,  sensor  pointing  with  respect  to  geography,  
target status, scan area coverage.  
HS2,6 
                    Quantitative   
   HS9  Log instances of induced system malfunction and task execution cause.    
   Operator Workload   
                    Qualitative   
   OW1  Does JMMES reduce operator workload for ISR collection?   W1,4,6 
   OW4  Is operating JMMES efficient?  W4‐6 
                    Quantitative   
   OW5  Log the time spent in each activity during a collection flight.    
   OW6  Log the time spent planning a mission.   
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APPENDIX C.  AOI SURVEY RESULTS 
















































































B. ASW AOI RESULTS 
  Miss‐Area Support      ISR Ops Support      Target SA 
  Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0  1  2  3  4      0  1  2  3  4 
50               50              50           
                                          
40                40              40           
                                           
30                30               30           
                                              
20                 20               20            
                                                 
10                  10                 10             
                                                   
0                   0                  0               
  4  43  30  17  4      13 36 21 21 9     42  21  32  5 0
 
 
  ISR Collect Activities      Workload      In‐Flight Syst Mgmt 
  Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0  1  2  3  4      0  1  2  3  4
50               50              50           
                                          
40               40              40           
                                           
30                30               30            
                                               
20                20                 20            
                                               
10                  10                 10              
                                                    
0                   0                  0              
  19  37  16  17  11      0 31 31 38 0     33  33  17  17 0
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  Human‐System      Automated Features 
  Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4     0 1  2  3  4 
50                50           
                            
40                40           
                            
30                30            
                              
20                 20              
                                
10                  10              
                                  
0                   0               
















C. MSAR AOI RESULTS 
 
  Miss‐Area Support      ISR Ops Support      Target SA 
  Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0 1  2  3  4      0 1  2  3 4
50               50              50            
                                           
40                40              40            
                                            
30                30               30            
                                               
20                  20                20            
                                                   
10                  10                  10             
                                                   
0                   0                  0               
  0  29  43  29  0      0 36 18 18 27     0 22  78  0 0
 
 
   ISR Collect Activities      Workload      In‐Flight Syst Mgmt   Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0 1  2 3  4     0  1  2  3  4
50               50               50            
                                            
40               40               40            
                                             
30                 30                30            
                                               
20                 20                20             
                                                 
10                  10                10              
                                                  
0                   0                  0               
  0  21  38  33  8      0 67 0 33 0     0  17  25  58 0
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  Human‐System      Automated Features 
  Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0 1 2  3  4 
50               50            
                            
40               40            
                             
30                30            
                             
20                  20            
                               
10                   10             
                                 
0                   0               








D. SUW AOI RESULTS 
 
  Miss‐Area Support      ISR Ops Support      Target SA 
  Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0 1  2  3  4     0 1  2  3  4
100               100              100           
                                          
80               80              80           
                                           
60                60              60           
                                            
40                40               40           
                                              
20                20                20             
                                                  
0                   0                  0               




  ISR Collect Activities      Workload      In‐Flight Syst Mgmt 
  Rating Level      Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0  1 2  3 4     0 1  2  3  4 
100               100              100           
                                          
80               80              80           
                                          
60                60               60           
                                             
40                40               40            
                                             
20                 20               20             
                                               
0                   0                  0               






Human‐System      Automated Features 
  Rating Level      Rating Level 
  0  1  2  3  4      0 1  2  3 4 
100               100           
                           
80               80           
                            
60               60            
                            
40               40            
                             
20                20            
                                
0                   0               
  0  22  22  44 11     0 80 20 0 0 
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